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ABSTRACT
Three Essays in Labor Economics: Fertility Expectations and Career Choice,
Specialization and the Marriage Premium, and Estimating Risk Aversion Using
Labor Supply Data. (May 2007)
Megan de Linde Leonard, B.A., Hendrix College
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Manuelita Ureta
Women, on average, are found in systematically different careers than men. The
reason for this phenomenon is not fully understood, in part because expectations play
a vital role in the process of career choice. Different religious groups have different
beliefs on the importance of child bearing, so fertility expectations should differ by
religious group. I include a woman’s religious denomination in regressions on mea-
sures of occupational flexibility. Jehovah’s Witnesses choose the most flexible careers
followed by Pentecostal, Catholic, Baptist, and Mainline Protestant women. Jewish
women generally choose the least flexible careers. This is consistent with the human
capital notion that women are choosing different careers than men rather than being
forced into different job paths.
If women are choosing jobs that allow them to take responsibility for home pro-
duction, how does this affect their husbands? Male wage regressions that include
marital status dummy variables find a marriage wage premium of 10 to 40%. This
premium may occur because wives are taking responsibility for home production and
husbands are free to focus their attention on productivity at work. It may also be
that factors unobserved to the researcher may make a man more productive and more
likely to marry. I use religious denomination as a proxy for specialization within the
home. Men in more traditional religious denominations enjoy a higher marriage wage
premium, which is evidence that household specialization of labor is an important
iv
cause of the wage premium.
The choice of a career, whether to marry, and most other important life decisions
are dependent on one’s risk tolerance. The role of risk preferences in such choices is
not fully understood, largely because relative risk aversion (γ) is hard to empirically
quantify. Chetty (2006) derives a formula for γ based on the link between utility and
labor supply decisions. I estimate γ at the micro level using the 1996 Panel Study
of Income Dynamics. I compare γ to an estimate based on hypothetical gambles
and find the measures substantially different. This supports Chetty’s claim that ex-
pected utility theory cannot sufficiently explain choices under uncertainty in different
domains.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Interesting economic phenomena abound in everyday life. By the age of 5, children
already assume that teachers are women and police officers are men. It isn’t until
later in life that one may begin to question why women are heavily concentrated in
some fields and conspicuously absent from others. It may be that women are choosing
careers that are amenable to the responsibilities of taking care of a family. It is also
possible that they face discrimination along the career path.
One of the issues that makes this problem difficult is the importance of expec-
tations in the career choice process. If a woman expects to have a large family and
many responsibilities within the home, she may be more likely to choose a career
that is compatible with this choice. Expectations are not always fulfilled and ig-
noring their importance can lead one to incorrect conclusions about the cause of a
woman’s career path. Different religious groups have different beliefs on gender roles
and the importance of child bearing. Because of this, fertility expectations should
differ by religious group. In Chapter II, I include a woman’s religious denomination
as a control in regressions on various measures of occupational flexibility. If religious
denomination has significant explanatory power on women’s career choices, then I can
conclude that to some extent, women are choosing careers that are most compatible
with their responsibilities in the home instead of being forced into a career because
of limited opportunities.
If women are choosing jobs that allow them to take responsibility for home pro-
duction and child rearing, how does this affect their husbands? Male wage regressions
The journal model is American Economic Review.
2that include marital status dummy variables almost always find that married men
earn a hefty wage premium. This could be precisely because their wives are taking
the primary responsibility for home production and husbands are free to focus their
attention on productivity at work. It may also be that a factor unobserved to the
researcher may both make a man more productive and more likely to marry. I inves-
tigate this question in Chapter III by again using religious denomination, this time
as a proxy for specialization within the home. If men in more traditional religious de-
nominations enjoy a higher marriage wage premium, this is evidence that household
specialization of labor is an important cause of the wage premium.
The choice of a career, a level of specialization within the home, whether to
marry and when, and most other important life decisions are heavily dependent on
one’s tolerance for risk. If a woman is very risk averse, for example, she may not be
willing to completely specialize in home production because of the chance that her
husband could die or leave. The role of risk preferences in these life choices is not
fully understood, largely because risk aversion is very hard to empirically quantify.
Raj Chetty (2006) uses the fact that relative risk aversion is directly related to the
ratio of the income and compensated wage elasticities of labor supply and presents
a formula that allows one to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion using
labor supply data. While the primary purpose of his paper is placing an upper bound
on risk aversion, Chetty’s measure has the potential to be very useful in explaining
individual risk preferences since most microeconomic datasets contain the necessary
information to estimate risk aversion in this manner. In Chapter IV, I estimate
Chetty’s coefficient of relative risk aversion at the micro level using the 1996 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and investigate his claims that the expected utility
model does not do a good job of explaining choices under uncertainty in different
domains.
3CHAPTER II
DO FERTILITY EXPECTATIONS AFFECT WOMEN’S CAREER CHOICES?
A. Introduction
While it is likely that uttering the phrase “that’s women’s work” would result in
nasty stares or worse, it does seem to be true that women choose systematically
different careers than do men. Women are concentrated in teaching and nursing, and
in academia, the humanities. Female dominated careers also tend to pay lower wages.
There are different explanations for this phenomenon. It may be that women value
job attributes differently than men do and are willing to pay for these attributes
through lower wages. The difference between the careers of men and women could
also be the result of discrimination. Women may be denied entry or advancement
in some careers. The explanation for this empirical regularity is very important. If
women are forced into certain careers because their market opportunities are limited,
their well-being could be increased by affirmative action type policies. If women are
simply responding optimally to their household’s utility maximization problem, no
such action is needed.
The underlying cause of the differences in careers by gender is difficult to de-
termine, in part because expectations play such a vital role in the decision process.
It may not be sufficient to look at a woman’s marital status and number of children
as the important factors in her career outcome. It is likely that a woman makes the
decision to go to college before her decision to marry or have children. At eighteen,
however, she may already know that she wants to have four children and thus decide
not to be a doctor. This same woman may end up single, childless, and in a dead-end
career because of her unfulfilled expectations. If one does not include her expecta-
4tions in the analysis, one will come to an incorrect conclusion about the origins of her
career path.
Unfortunately, most data sets employed by economists provide no information
about expectations. Those that do are forced to focus on young women because the
expectations that shape women’s futures are formed early in life. It is then necessary
to follow these women for a long period of time to see how their expectations affected
their careers. Using older women could alleviate this tracking problem, but they would
have to be asked about their past expectations which may be difficult to recall or
separate from what actually occurred. These issues sharply narrow the data available
for use in studying this problem. Sandell and Shapiro (1980) use the 1968 National
Longitudinal Study of Young Women and find that expectations of higher labor force
participation result in women receiving more on-the-job training. Blakemore and Low
(1983) utilize data from the National Longitudinal Survey of High School Seniors in
1972 to see how expected fertility affects the choice of a college major. As things
have changed a lot for women since these two surveys, this paper makes an important
contribution to the literature because it brings more recent data to bear on the issue.
A proper analysis requires recent data that contains information on a woman’s
expectations of absence from the labor force and obligations within the home when
she made her career decision. I argue that a woman’s religious preference is helpful
in this respect. Some religious denominations put a large emphasis on families, child
rearing, and traditional gender roles. Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, believe that
“a husband is the head of his family”; and “a wife should be a good helper for her
husband.”1 The statement of faith of the Southern Baptist church echoes a similar
sentiment; “a wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her
1From http://www.watchtower.org “Family Life That Pleases God”
5husband” and she “has the God-given responsibility to respect her husband and to
serve as his helper in managing the household and nurturing the next generation2.”
The United Methodist Church (2004), on the other hand, has a very different view
of the role of women.
We affirm women and men to be equal in every aspect of their common
life. We therefore urge that every effort be made to eliminate sex-role
stereotypes in activity and portrayal of family life and in all aspects of
voluntary and compensatory participation in the Church and society.
In their study of religious denomination and gender attitudes, Brinkerhoff and
MacKie (1984) find that Pentecostals are among the least egalitarian denominations,
followed by Baptists and Catholics. Presbyterians were the most egalitarian denom-
ination that they investigated. Their study did not address Jews. Jews have lower
fertility than other groups (Goldstein 1992), so Jewish women may expect less time
out of the labor force. In contrast, devout Catholics eschew all but natural means of
birth control and thus may have higher expectations of fertility than women of other
religious groups.
Women know what religion they are in from a young age and thus have the
opportunity to make career related decisions based on their expected fertility and
family role. If the differences in the careers of men and women are due to choice
in a labor market that does not discriminate against women, women in religious de-
nominations that emphasize traditional gender roles and discourage the use of birth
control should have higher fertility on average and be found in careers that are more
compatible with greater in-home responsibilities. Groups that stress equality should
behave in a manner more similar to women with no religious preference. If Jehovah’s
2http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bfm2000.asp
6Witness, Pentecostal, Catholic, and Baptist women choose systematically different
careers than Jews and Mainline Protestant women such as Methodists and Presbyte-
rians, then I can conclude that to some extent, women are choosing careers that are
most compatible with their expected familial responsibilities instead of being forced
into a career because of limited opportunities.
B. Literature Review
Economists have a lot to say about the discrimination versus choice debate. In his
seminal paper, Becker (1985) posits that there are increasing returns to specialized
human capital, so married couples have an incentive to create “a division of labor in
the allocation of time and investment in human capital.” Since women do a dispro-
portionate amount of the family’s child care and housework, they have less of their
effort endowment to spend on the job and thus make less money than men with equal
human capital. It is not a matter of discrimination; it is household utility maximiza-
tion. McDowell’s (1982) findings support the human capital approach in the careers
of women in academia. Women are more likely to interrupt their careers than men,
these interruptions cause some degree of knowledge obsolescence, and this obsoles-
cence varies by field. The fact that women are more often in the humanities than the
sciences is a direct response to the higher cost of career interruptions in fields where
knowledge is less durable. Women aren’t choosing the humanities because they can-
not get jobs as scientists; they are choosing humanities because the relative costs of
interruptions are lower.
Polachek’s (1981) paper is very similar in spirit to McDowell’s. He recognizes
that variation in kinds of human capital may be as important as variations in amount.
Since women do not all participate continuously in the labor force, their maximization
7problem should include choosing not only lifetime investment in human capital, but
occupation as well. Because different occupations differ in the cost of labor force
intermittency, an individual will choose the occupation that imposes the smallest
penalty given a desired level of lifetime labor force participation, all else equal. He
finds that there is a strong relationship between lifetime labor force participation
and occupational choice. He looks at the effect of actual labor force separations on
occupational choice, though theory says that expected labor force participation is the
variable of interest.
It is important to note that it is a woman’s expectation of labor force attachment
and career path that shapes her career decisions in both the human capital and
discrimination explanations. If a woman expects discrimination, she may not bother
to get higher education or seek a prestigious job. Likewise, if she expects to spend
a lot of time out of the labor force, she may seek a different type of job than if
she planned to work continuously. Realizing the importance of expectations and
the scarcity of data about it, Blau and Ferber (1991) survey college business school
seniors and collect information on their career plans and earnings expectations. The
women and men they survey expect the same starting salaries, but women anticipate
lower earnings in later years. This holds even for women who plan on continuous
employment. A woman seems to expect to make less money for performing the same
job as a comparable man regardless of her planned labor force participation. This
expected glass ceiling may deter her from investing in her job in the same way a man
would.
Gronau (1988) also finds evidence contrary to the human capital approach. He
uses simultaneous equations to trace the interrelationship between interruptions in
women’s careers and their wages. He finds that the skill intensity of a woman’s job,
which is important for earning power, is independent of her labor force plans. This
8seems to imply that women face restrictions in choosing their jobs.
The literature addressing this debate has produced mixed evidence. This could
be in part because it is difficult to get current and general data on labor force par-
ticipation plans of women, which is a key variable. In this paper I include a woman’s
religion as an indicator of her labor force participation plans to shed additional light
on this interesting puzzle.
C. Data
I use data from the 1985 to 2001 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal data set collected by the University of Michi-
gan. The PSID includes questions on a respondent’s religious preference and allows
me to identify many different religious denominations. The denominations I consider
are Jehovah’s Witness, Pentecostal, Catholic, Baptist, Jewish, and Mainline Protes-
tant, which includes Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, and “Other
Protestant.” Unfortunately, I only have information on the woman’s current religious
preference. As most individuals do not radically change their religious affiliations over
time, this analysis is still expected to provide valuable information. The Encyclopedia
Britannica gives statistics for religious preference over time. Out of 254,076,000 indi-
viduals in the United States in 1990, only 129,000 had converted to another religion
by 19953.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the women in my sample. Although the
PSID is a longitudinal data set, I include each woman in the sample only once. If
she appears in more that one year in the time period, her most recent information is
3http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9346285
9used in the analysis4. I restrict the sample to include only women between the ages of
25 and 55. Women younger than 25 are not included because of the possibility that
these women are combining school and work. I also exclude women who are nearing
retirement. The average age in the sample is 40. Fifty-eight percent of the women are
married and the average number of children under 17 years of age in the household is
1.17. Women in the sample have 12.6 years of education on average. Approximately
33% of women in the sample are Baptist, 27% are Mainline Protestant, 27% are
Catholic, 3% are Pentecostal, 2% Jewish, 1% are Jehovah’s Witness, and 7% have no
religious preference.
D. Theory
The model used in this analysis is based on the idea of compensating differentials.
Every job in the market contains many dimensions, and workers derive utility from
both the wage and the amenities of a particular job. Workers are assumed to have
different demands for job amenities, and firms are faced with different costs of pro-
viding the amenities. A firm will only incur costs in order to provide the desirable
feature if it can then reduce the wage that it offers.
In the compensating differentials framework, if two groups of people have different
preferences for wages and job amenities, utility maximization will result in different
wages between the two groups and they will be found in different types of occupations
(Filer 1985). The differences in the wages and occupations of men and women may
simply be due to different preferences.
I must now consider why a woman might value different job attributes than
would a man and what amenities she might demand. Women differ from men in
4Results are not sensitive to the year in which a woman appears in the data set.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics from PSID-Women Only
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 9508 40.191 9.289 25 55
Number of Children 9508 1.171 1.251 0 9
Married 9508 0.582 0.493 - -
Years of Education 9187 12.590 2.620 1 17
Northeast 7105 0.153 0.360 - -
Northcentral 7105 0.224 0.417 - -
South 7105 0.455 0.498 - -
West 7105 0.166 0.372 - -
Proportion Jehovah’s Witness 9508 0.010 0.101 - -
Proportion Pentecostal 9508 0.033 0.178 - -
Proportion Catholic 9508 0.265 0.441 - -
Proportion Baptist 9508 0.329 0.470 - -
Proportion Mainline Protestant 9508 0.271 0.445 - -
Proportion Jewish 9508 0.018 0.133 - -
Proportion with No Religious Preference 9508 0.073 0.261 - -
Notes: Data is from the PSID and includes only women between the ages of 25 and 55.
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that they generally have the primary responsibility for child care. Children require
constant care, so if a woman chooses to work outside the home, the family must
find and finance child care and transport the child there every day. Because leaving
children in another’s care is costly both in monetary and psychic terms, there is value
in having a job that is compatible with the responsibilities of having children. Sick
children cannot go to school or daycare, so someone must stay home with children
when they are ill as well. Having a job that allows a mother to deal with unforseen
circumstances is desirable.
The job amenity that I consider is flexibility. According to a survey done in 1997
by the Pew Research Center5, 73% of mothers said that job flexibility was a very
important job attribute. I assume that women value jobs that allow them to take
time off if they need it, arrange their schedules around the schedules of their children,
etc. The more children a woman has, the more time she will need off for maternity
leave, the more likely it is that there will be an illness on a given day, and the more
schedules there are to juggle. I therefore assume that the more children a woman
expects to have, the more she will value a flexible job.
As shown in Figure 1, women who expect many children have steeper indifference
curves indicating that they are more willing to trade off wages for flexibility. They
work at firms that have a lower cost of providing flexibility than men or women
who expect to have few children. Women with very steep indifference curves may
locate themselves on the boundary, consuming the maximum amount of flexibility
and accepting a wage of zero, i.e., not working in the market.
5http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=520
12
w1
w2
flex1 flex2
flexibility
wage
Fig. 1. Wage-flexibility Trade-off: Compensating Differentials Framework
The wage-flexibility trade-off probably explains why we see so many women ac-
cepting relatively low wages to become teachers. Teaching is attractive to women
because it allows a mother to take advantage of her school age children’s predictable
schedules. Teaching does not, however, offer a great deal of flexibility in regards to
temporary shocks such as a child’s illness. Because flexibility has more than one
dimension that may be important to mothers, I define two components of flexibility:
predictable flexibility and unpredictable flexibility.
Jobs have a great deal of predictable flexibility if they are very compatible with
the day-to-day family needs that can be anticipated. Unpredictable flexibility refers
to the ability to accommodate unexpected events such as a child’s illness or a for-
gotten school project. When children are young, the majority of their needs may be
unpredictable, making it desirable for the mother to stay at home for a period of
time. Jobs that easily accommodate entry and exit from the labor force would be
considered unpredictably flexible, for example.
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E. Findings
Flexibility is difficult to define empirically. Because of this, I will explore several
different empirical definitions of flexibility and see if the estimated effect of religious
preference on measured job flexibility is consistent across the different flexibility mea-
sures. As described above, flexibility has more than one dimension. Mothers value
jobs that allow them to be home for their children’s predictable needs and jobs that
allow them to be home in the case of unexpected shocks. I construct one measure of
predictable flexibility, two measures of unpredictable flexibility, and one measure of
general flexibility.
The predictable components of job flexibility are those that allow workers to
take advantage of their child’s schedule. I construct one variable that represents
predictable flexibility empirically: the average hours worked in a usual week in the
occupation. Long hours at work allow for less time with the family and require more
money to be spent on child care. This variable is calculated from the 1990 Census
1% sample for each of the 505 occupation codes using data on men only. Women are
not included in calculating job attributes to avoid endogeneity problems.
The two measures of unpredictable flexibility are the fraction of men who work
from home in each of the 505 occupations and the rate of depreciation for each of
17 occupational classes. In order to work in the market and also provide for her
children’s needs, a woman may choose to work from home if the option is available to
her. The 1990 Census asks respondents how they get to work each day. A little over
36,000 of the respondents report that they work from home. Since the ability to work
from home allows women to both work and care for their children in many cases, this
measure is an important piece of the flexibility puzzle. I use the fraction of men who
work from home in a given occupation as a measure of each job’s flexibility.
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Instead of working from home while her children are young, a woman may decide
to drop out of the labor force for a period of time. It would then be necessary for her
to consider the amount of depreciation of job related skills associated with a given
career. The larger is the job related knowledge depreciation, the more costly is any
interruption in participation. If a woman expects interruptions to be long, she may
opt for a career with less skills depreciation.
I estimate rates of human capital depreciation for 17 occupational categories
using Chutubtim’s (2005) modification of Ureta and Welch (2001). Their spin on the
standard Mincer wage regression is to differentiate workers with the same amount of
work experience who accumulated this experience at different points in their careers.
Since women have more career interruptions than men, acknowledging that older work
experience may have different returns than more recent experience is particularly
important. For women who work continuously, this specification is the standard
Mincer model.
Following Ureta and Welch (2001), if a person works full time between times t1
and t2, the instantaneous rate of human capital accumulation at time t = τ is
dlnK(τ)
dτ
= α for t1 ≤ τ ≤ t2.
Let δ denote the instantaneous rate at which accumulated human capital depreciates
from the time at which is it acquired, τ , to the present, T :
Depreciation by time T of human capital attained at τ =
∫ T
τ
αδ dt = αδ(T − τ).
Net human capital accumulation at T for work done between t1 and t2 is:
∫ t2
t1
(α− αδ(T − t)) dt = α(t2 − t1)− αδ
(
T (t2 − t1)− t
2
2 − t21
2
)
= αD − αδD
(
T − t2 + t1
2
)
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= αD − αδ(DA),
where D = t2 − t1 is the duration of the employment spell and A = T − t2+t12 is the
average age of the employment spell.
For a worker with I spells, net accumulation of human capital is:
α
(
I∑
i=1
Di
)
− αδ
(
I∑
i=1
DiA
)
where
∑I
i=1Di is the aggregate spell duration and A is the average age of the I spells.
In order to estimate the rate of depreciation for various occupations, I use the
following wage equation:
lnWi = β0 + β1X1 + α
T∑
t=1
Di,t + αδ
(
T∑
t=1
Di,tAi
)
+ εi (2.1)
where lnWi is the log of the weekly wage and X includes indicator variables for living
in a rural area, living in the center of a metropolitan area, living in the suburbs,
married, education level, race, region, whether the youngest child is of school age,
whether the woman speaks English, and whether she works full-time. Also included
in the X vector is the number of children in the woman’s household and the number
of years since her highest degree was earned.
Census data does not contain information on a worker’s complete employment
history. Because of this, I use the method in Chutubtim (2005) to construct values
for
∑I
i=1Di and A. By assuming that women only leave the labor market in order
to have children, I can construct employment histories for the women in the sample
using information on their age, education, number of children, and age of children.
Chutubtim makes the reasonable assumption that time out of the labor force
will differ by education level and estimates the maximum career interruption for each
education category. For each level of education she is interested in three probabilities,
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the percentage of women who do not take time out of the labor force after giving
birth (P1), the percentage of women who take 3 years out of the labor force (P2),
and the percentage of women who take 12 years out of the labor force (P3). To
simplify the analysis, she considers women who have only one child. To calculate these
probabilities, one needs to know how much time a woman is out of the labor force
after the birth of a child. The Census data does not directly contain this information,
but a woman’s occupational information allows one to draw some inferences. If a
woman is out of the labor force in 1990 but has a reported occupation, she has been
out of the labor force for no more than 5 years. If a woman is out of the labor force
in 1990 and she does not have a reported occupation, one can infer that she has been
out of the labor force for more than 5 years.
Using this information, P1 is assumed to be the proportion of women with a
child under the age of one who are in the labor force. P2 is the proportion of
women with a child between the ages of 1 and 5 who are out of the labor force
for fewer than five years, and P3 is the proportion of women with a child between
the ages of 6 and 17 who are out of the labor force for more than 5 years. For each
level of education, the maximum number of years of career interruption is given by
(P1 ∗ 0) + (P2 ∗ 3) + (P3 ∗ 12). Chutubtim calculates these probabilities from the
2000 Census and finds that for women with less than a high school education, the
maximum time out of the labor force per child is 9 years. High school graduates
have a maximum time out of 7 years, women with some college 4 years, and college
graduates 2 years.
Chutubtim assumes that during the nth year of a career interruption spell, the
probability that a woman will return to work equals the labor force participation rate
of women with one child age n. These probabilities can be found in Table 2 and
are taken directly from Chutubtim (2005). On the birth of her first child, a high
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school drop out will return to the labor force after zero years out with probability
35.06%. With probability 24.89%, she will be assigned 1 year of career interruption.
With probability 15.99% she will be assigned 2 years out of the labor force, with
probability 9.63% she will be assigned 3 years, and so on until 100% of women return
after the 9th year.
I use the probabilities in Table 2 to assign career interruption spells to all women
aged 25 to 44 in the 1990 Census based on their educational attainment, number
of children, and children’s ages. For example, 71.82% of women who have at least
a college education are randomly assigned zero years out of the labor force upon
the birth of their first child. 20.09% of women with at least a college education are
assigned an interruption of 1 year when their first child is born. The remaining 8.09%
of college educated women are assigned 2 years out of the labor force at the birth of
their first child. If a woman has more than one child, she may have several career
interruption spells. Take, for example, a woman with two children. If the difference
in her children’s ages is greater than her first assigned career interruption spell, she
will be assigned an additional spell using the probabilities in Table 2. If the initial
spell is greater than the age gap between her children, she will have both children
during the initial interruption and return to work permanently after the first spell.
After career interruption spells have been assigned, I can easily calculate expe-
rience for each woman based on her assigned career interruptions. Given the infor-
mation in the Census, I can also define potential experience for each woman, i.e., age
minus education minus 6. For women who are college graduates, the correlation be-
tween potential experience and imputed experience based on assigned interruptions is
98.73%. For high school graduates, the correlation is 97.2%. For high school dropouts,
on the other hand, the correlation between potential experience and assigned experi-
ence is 81.42%. High school dropouts have significantly more children than the rest
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Table 2. Percentage of Women Returning to the Labor Force Each Year after the Birth
of a Child
Percentage of
Education level Child’s women returning
age to the labor force
Less than high school 0 35.06%
1 24.89%
2 15.99%
3 9.63%
4 6.47%
5 3.70%
6 2.09%
7 1.20%
8 0.51%
9 0.47%
Total 100%
High school 0 55.89%
1 25.59%
2 11.55%
3 4.52%
4 1.63%
5 0.57%
6 0.18%
7 0.07%
Total 100%
Some college 0 67.41%
1 22.21%
2 7.60%
3 2.11%
4 0.67%
Total 100%
College or higher 0 71.82%
1 20.09%
2 8.09%
Total 100%
Notes: This information comes from Table 6 of Chutubtim
(2005) and is calculated using the 2000 Census. The percentage
of women that return to the labor market in the nth year of
a career interruption spell is assumed to be equal to the labor
force participation rate of women with one child age n.
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of the sample, so it is probable that potential experience is a less accurate measure
of experience for these women as they have likely taken time out of the labor force
since their last year of schooling.
I estimate equation 2.1 for 17 occupational categories based on the Census oc-
cupation codes: Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations, Professional
speciality occupations, Teachers and school workers, Athletes and artistic occupa-
tions, Technicians, Sales occupations, Office supervisors, Administrative support oc-
cupations, Clerks, Communications operators, dispatchers, and investigators, Food
service occupations, Health service occupations, Cleaning service occupations, Mis-
cellaneous service occupations, Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations, Precision
production, craft, and repair occupations, and Operators, fabricators, and laborers.
The categories were as finely partitioned as possible while still including reasonable
numbers in each group.
The estimated rate of depreciation for each occupational group is found by divid-
ing the coefficient on duration-weighted average age of the employment spells by the
aggregate employment duration, i.e., αδ
α
. The regression results from equation 2.1 can
be found in Table 3. The perverse signs on experience for cleaning and food service
occupations are driven by a small number of women with low wages and no children
and thus very large values of imputed experience. The imputed measures are more
noisy for these women.
The depreciation rates and their standard errors for each of the 17 occupational
categories can be found in Table 4. The ranking of occupations by human capital
depreciation seems reasonable. Food service occupations have a low level of depreci-
ation, 3.9% per year. Administrative support occupations, clerks, production, craft,
and repair occupations, communications operators, and cleaning occupations all have
depreciation rates of around 4.5%. Technicians and professional speciality occupa-
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Table 3. Estimation of Equation 2.1: Log Annual Wage
Variable Coefficient Std. Err
Aggregate employment duration
Cleaning service occupations -0.012*** 0.002
Athletes and artistic occupations 0.022*** 0.002
Teachers and school workers, except post secondary 0.027*** 0.001
Office supervisors 0.031*** 0.002
Communications operators,dispatchers, and investigators 0.023*** 0.001
Sales occupations 0.012*** 0.001
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations 0.043*** 0.001
Precision production, craft, and repair occupations 0.024*** 0.002
Administrative support occupations 0.012*** 0.001
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 0.011*** 0.001
Health service occupations 0.003* 0.002
Professional speciality occupations 0.064*** 0.001
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations -0.005* 0.003
Clerks 0.01*** 0.001
Technicians 0.043*** 0.001
Food service occupations -0.012*** 0.001
Miscellaneous service occupations 0.001 0.002
Duration-weighted average age of employment spells
Cleaning service occupations 0.001*** 0.000
Athletes and artistic occupations -0.001*** 0.000
Teachers and school workers, except post secondary -0.001*** 0.000
Office supervisors -0.002*** 0.000
Communications operators,dispatchers, and investigators -0.001*** 0.000
Sales Occupations -0.001*** 0.000
Executive, administrative, and managerial occupations -0.002*** 0.000
Precision production, craft, and repair occupations -0.001*** 0.000
Administrative support occupations -0.001*** 0.000
Operators, fabricators, and laborers -0.001*** 0.000
Health service occupations 0.000 0.000
Professional speciality occupations -0.004*** 0.000
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations 0.000 0.000
Clerks 0.000*** 0.000
Technicians -0.002*** 0.000
Food service occupations 0.000*** 0.000
Miscellaneous service occupations 0.000*** 0.000
Does not speak English -0.143*** 0.008
Black -0.019*** 0.003
Hispanic -0.042*** 0.004
Number of Children -0.047*** 0.001
Married 0.014*** 0.002
Youngest child of school age -0.068*** 0.003
Center of a metropolitan area 0.11*** 0.003
Suburbs 0.123*** 0.002
Rural -0.078*** 0.002
High school graduate 0.116*** 0.004
Some college 0.237*** 0.004
College graduate 0.498*** 0.005
Years since last degree 0.006*** 0.001
Full time work 0.717*** 0.003
Constant 4.651*** 0.008
Observations 261,252
F-statistic 3570.74
Notes: *Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** 5%, *** at the 1% level. Data comes
from the 1990 Census 1% sample. Controls for region are included but not shown.
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Table 4. Estimated Depreciation Rates by Occupation
Occupation Obs Depreciation Std. Err
Miscellaneous service occupations 8879 0.252 0.200
Farming, forestry, & fishing occupations 1637 0.005 0.045
Food service 12069 0.039 0.006
Administrative Support Occupations 36365 0.044 0.004
Clerks 17766 0.044 0.006
Precision production, craft, & repair occupations 6540 0.044 0.004
Communications operators,dispatchers, & investigators 11965 0.045 0.003
Cleaning service occupations 5152 0.046 0.006
Teachers & school workers, except post secondary 21461 0.048 0.003
Office supervisors 5053 0.048 0.004
Executive, Administrative, & Managerial Occupations 34409 0.054 0.001
Operators, fabricators, & laborers 24517 0.055 0.004
Athletes & artistic occupations 4242 0.055 0.006
Technicians 12159 0.058 0.002
Sales Occupations 25344 0.059 0.005
Professional speciality occupations 24849 0.063 0.001
Health Service Occupations 8850 0.075 0.025
Total 261257
Notes: All depreciation rates are significant except Miscellaneous service and
Farming, forestry, and fishing occupations. These values are calculated using the 1990
Census 1% sample using Chutubtim’s (2005) modification of Ureta and Welch (2001).
The depreciation rates are calculated by dividing the coefficient on duration-weighted
average age of employment spells by the coefficient on aggregate employment duration
in the wage regression given in Table 3 for each of the 17 occupational categories.
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tions have depreciation rates of 5.8 and 6.3%, respectively. These careers generally
require a large amount of training, job-specific knowledge, and education so large de-
preciation estimates are reasonable. Health service occupations have the largest point
estimate for depreciation, but it is less precisely estimated than the aforementioned
occupational categories. Because the depreciation rate for miscellaneous service oc-
cupations and farming, forestry, and fishing occupations is not significantly different
from zero, they will be assigned a value of zero for this flexibility measure.
One way to lessen the wage penalty due to human capital depreciation is to
continue to work. Many women find that working part time allows them to keep up
in their field while mitigating the household costs associated with being a working
mother. According to the Pew Research Center survey, 44% of mothers of children
under 18 say that they would prefer to work part time, compared to only 30% who
would prefer to work full time. Working part time allows a mother to arrange her
schedule around her child’s schedule as well as have a greater ability to respond to
unexpected needs. Because of the apparent widespread appeal of working part time,
this is included as a general measure of flexibility. This measure is defined by asking:
given that a man is in occupation i, what is the probability that he works part time?
Table 5 gives the values of the flexibility variables for selected occupations. The
results accord with expectations; child care workers and food service workers work
relatively few hours on average while veterinarians and farmers work long hours. As
expected, no air traffic controllers or telephone lineman work from home. Dressmak-
ers, painters, and authors do frequently work from home, however. According to the
depreciation measures, waitresses and maids have flexible jobs while physicians and
chemical engineers do not. Twenty eight percent of teacher aides work part time
while less than 0.5% of physicists and astronomers do.
I am proposing that religious preference gives us information on expected fertil-
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Table 6. Mean Number of Children by Religious Preference
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err Std. Dev. Min Max
Jehovah’s Witness 98 1.520 0.158 1.568 0 7
Pentecostal 310 1.332 0.071 1.247 0 6
Catholic 2521 1.311 0.026 1.329 0 9
Baptist 3131 1.224 0.022 1.251 0 9
None 698 1.082 0.047 1.242 0 6
Mainline Protestant 2578 0.986 0.022 1.138 0 6
Jewish 172 0.808 0.083 1.083 0 5
Notes: Data is from the PSID and includes women between the ages of
25 and 55 only.
ity. While not all expectations will be realized, if the proposed relationship holds in
general, religious preference should be related to number of children. Table 6 shows
that this is indeed the case. Jehovah’s Witnesses have more children than any other
group with an average of 1.5 children. Pentecostal and Catholic women have the
next largest families, 1.3 children on average. Baptist women have 1.2 children on
average, significantly more than women professing no religious preference. Mainline
Protestant women have an average of 0.99 children. As expected, Jewish women have
the fewest children with an average of 0.81.
Women who expect to have many children have less incentive to invest in educa-
tion than women who expect to have few children because time out of the labor force
means less time to benefit from investments in education. Table 7 examines years of
education by religious preference. The results are consistent with group ideology and
with actual fertility as seen in Table 6. Jehovah’s Witnesses, a group that stresses
traditional gender roles and has the highest fertility on average, get significantly less
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Table 7. Mean Years of Education by Religious Preference
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err Std. Dev.
Jehovah’s Witness 93 11.376 0.246 2.372
Pentecostal 297 11.848 0.136 2.342
Catholic 2421 12.057 0.067 3.287
Baptist 3030 12.353 0.038 2.089
Mainline Protestant 2522 13.189 0.046 2.304
None 661 13.195 0.096 2.470
Jewish 163 15.252 0.161 2.056
Notes: Data is from the PSID and includes women between the
ages of 25 and 55 only.
education than any other group. Pentecostal women, another very conservative group
with high fertility, get the next fewest years of education, less than a high school de-
gree on average. Catholic women have more children on average than Baptist women
and get significantly less education. Average years of education are nearly identical
for women with no religious preference and the more socially liberal Mainline Protes-
tant denominations. Jewish women, the group with the lowest fertility, get more than
2 years more education on average than any other group.
The theory predicts that women who expect to have more children or who an-
ticipate having the primary responsibility for housework should choose more flexible
careers. To test this theory, I regress various measures of flexibility on indicator
variables for a woman’s religious preference. The PSID contains information on each
individual woman’s occupation and she is assigned each of the four measures of flexi-
bility based on that occupation. I then estimate the following equation using ordinary
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least squares (OLS):
Flexibilityi = α+ β1Jehovah
′sWitnessi + β2Pentecostali (2.2)
+β3Catholici + β4Baptisti + β5MainlineProtestanti
+β6Jewishi + εi.
where i indexes an individual woman and flexibility is defined for a given occupation
by four different measures: the average usual hours worked per week by men in the
occupation, the fraction of men in the occupation who work from home, depreciation,
and the fraction of men in the occupation who work part time. If a woman does
not work, she is assigned a value of 1 for fraction who work part time and fraction
who work from home. Women who do not work cannot be assigned a value for
average usual hours worked or depreciation, so there are fewer observations in these
regressions. The results are not sensitive to dropping all women who do not work.
Because two of the flexibility measures lie between 0 and 1, the variance of ε will
depend on the values of the right-hand-side variables. To deal with this problem, I
use robust standard errors in all regressions. The predicted values of the flexibility
measures for these two measures never lie outside the unit interval, so this drawback
of OLS is not a concern.
Table 8 shows the results of the regressions of the various flexibility variables on
indicator variables for religion. When flexibility is defined by fraction who work from
home and fraction part time, positive coefficients denote more flexible careers. In the
depreciation and usual hours worked specifications, negative coefficients signify more
flexibility. The omitted group is women with no religious preference.
Religious ideology, actual fertility, and years of education all suggest that if
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Table 8. Religion as a Predictor of Career Flexibility
Flexibility Measure
Fraction Fraction work Average hours Depreciation
part time from home worked
Jehovah’s Witness 0.138** 0.129** -1.789*** -0.004*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.45) (0.00)
Pentecostal 0.101*** 0.096*** -0.837** -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.00)
Catholic 0.109*** 0.107*** -0.189 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Baptist 0.042* 0.038* -0.754*** -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00)
Mainline Protestant 0.020 0.018 -0.119 -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Jewish 0.018 0.021 0.979** 0.005***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.33) (0.00)
Constant 0.219*** 0.207*** 43.123*** 0.049***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.00)
Observations 9508 9508 7202 7202
F-statistic 14.319 13.683 14.306 3.882
Notes: *Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1% level.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Average usual hours worked, fraction who work from home,
and fraction part time are all defined for each of the 505 Census occupation codes from the
1990 1% sample using men between the ages of 25 and 55. Depreciation is defined for 17
occupational categories as described in the text. The individual level data is from the PSID
for women between the ages 25 and 55.
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women are choosing careers in order to balance work and family, Jehovah’s Witnesses
will choose the most flexible careers followed by Pentecostal, Catholic, and Baptist
women. Mainline Protestant women and Jewish women are not expected to seek
more flexible careers than women with no religious preference. The hypothesis is
supported in general across all definitions. Jehovah’s Witnesses, a group that empha-
sizes traditional gender roles and the group with the largest number of children on
average, are found in significantly more flexible careers than women with no religious
preference regardless of the definition of flexibility. The magnitude of the coefficients
is also largest for these women in every specification. Pentecostal women are found
in significantly more flexible careers as well. Catholic women have the next largest
coefficient magnitudes in general, followed by Baptist women. This ordering is con-
sistent with religious ideology, actual fertility, and years of education. Because the
Mainline Protestant groups tend to emphasize equality, the hypothesis suggests that
these women will not choose significantly more flexible careers than women with no
religious preference. This is indeed the case; while the coefficients suggest a prefer-
ence for more flexibility, none of them are statistically significant. Jewish women are
found in careers with a higher level of depreciation and a greater number of hours
worked on average than women with no religious preference. Results are not sensitive
to the inclusion of age as a control variable.
F. Further Investigation of the Channels through Which Religion Affects Career
Outcomes
Women in different religious groups clearly differ in their tastes for job flexibility. As
demonstrated earlier, women in more conservative religions have more children and
get fewer years of education on average. I argue that these differences are due to
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ideological differences by religion in the function of the family and the role of women.
Women in religions that stress child-rearing as the primary responsibility of the wife
are likely to have more children and less likely to invest in education. I would like
to know how these two variables affect the choice of career flexibility and whether
religious denomination has explanatory power on job flexibility even after controls for
these channels have been added.
While affecting the choice of education and number of children are the most
obvious ways that religious denomination affects outcomes, denomination may have
an effect on career choice even controlling for these factors. Not all expectations
are fulfilled, and religious denomination is a proxy for unfulfilled expectations even
when controls for children and education are added. Denomination may also pick up
differences in responsibilities in the home.
In Table 9 I examine the impact of religious denomination on career flexibility
when I control for number of children, the most obvious channel by which religion
effects career choice. Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
Flexibilityi = α+ β1Jehovah
′sWitnessi + β2Pentecostali (2.3)
+β3Catholici + β4Baptisti + β5MainlineProtestanti
+β6Jewishi + β7Kidsi + εi
where i indexes individual women in the PSID between the ages of 25 and 55 and
Kidsi is the number of children under 17 in the household. While number of children
significantly increases the level of job flexibility, the magnitude of the coefficient
is smaller than the coefficient on religious denomination for most groups in every
specification. Comparing these results to those in Table 8, we see that controlling for
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Table 9. Religion as a Predictor of Career Flexibility with Control for Number of
Children
Flexibility Measure
Fraction Fraction work Average usual Depreciation
part time from home hours worked
Jehovah’s Witness 0.122** 0.113* -1.709*** -0.004
(0.04) (0.04) (0.45) (0.00)
Pentecostal 0.092** 0.087** -0.802** -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.00)
Catholic 0.101*** 0.099*** -0.166 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Baptist 0.037* 0.033 -0.721*** -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00)
Mainline Protestant 0.024 0.022 -0.128 -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Jewish 0.028 0.031 0.930** 0.005**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.33) (0.00)
Number of children 0.036*** 0.037*** -0.163*** -0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Constant 0.180*** 0.168*** 43.285*** 0.049***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.00)
Observations 9508 9508 7202 7203
F-statistic 29.058 28.273 15.336 4.831
Notes: * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1%
level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Average usual hours worked, fraction who
work from home, and fraction part time are all defined for each of the 505 Census
occupation codes from the 1990 1% sample using men between the ages of 25 and 55.
Depreciation is defined for 17 occupational categories as described in the text. The
individual level data is from the PSID for women between the ages 25 and 55.
actual fertility has very little effect on the coefficients on religious denomination.
Controlling for education has a greater effect on the magnitude of the coefficients
on religious denomination than does controlling for number of children, as shown in
Table 10. Education is strongly negatively related to job flexibility. This is to be
expected since wages and flexibility are inversely related and education and wages are
positively related. Flexibility decreases as education increases. High school dropouts
are found in the most flexible careers. College graduates in less flexible careers than
high school graduates and those with some college.
It appears that the primary way in which religious denomination affects behav-
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Table 10. Religion as a Predictor of Career Flexibility with Control for Education
Flexibility Measure
Fraction Fraction work Average usual Depreciation
part time from home hours worked
Jehovah’s Witness 0.074 0.064 -1.359* -0.002
(0.05) (0.05) (0.53) (0.00)
Pentecostal 0.054 0.049 -0.515 0.000
(0.03) (0.03) (0.29) (0.00)
Catholic 0.080*** 0.078*** -0.063 -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Baptist 0.007 0.003 -0.529*** 0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.00)
Mainline Protestant 0.022 0.020 -0.086 -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00)
Jewish 0.080* 0.083* 0.574 0.003**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.35) (0.00)
High school graduate -0.182*** -0.184*** 0.463*** 0.002***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00)
Some college -0.251*** -0.254*** 0.920*** 0.004***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00)
College graduate -0.306*** -0.306*** 1.712*** 0.008***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.00)
Advanced degree -0.272*** -0.276*** 1.506*** 0.007***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00)
Constant 0.418*** 0.409*** 42.228*** 0.044***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Observations 9508 9508 7202 7202
F-statistic 66.669 64.678 24.387 24.074
Notes: * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1%
level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Average usual hours worked, fraction who
work from home, and fraction part time are all defined for each of the 505 Census
occupation codes from the 1990 1% sample using men between the ages of 25 and 55.
Depreciation is defined for 17 occupational categories as described in the text. The
individual level data is from the PSID for women between the ages 25 and 55.
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ior and thus career choice is through investments in education. It is possible that
certain religious groups stress the importance of education more than others for rea-
sons unrelated to fertility, but even when controls for education are added, religious
denomination still has significant explanatory power over career choice. Jehovah’s
Witness and Baptist women are less likely to work in careers that require long hours.
Catholic women are significantly more likely to work part time or work from home
than women with no religious preference. When controls for education are added,
Jewish women are more likely to work part time or work from home than women
with no religious preference.
While it is easy to argue that religious preference has a causal effect on number
of children and years of education, it is possible that there are characteristics that are
correlated with a woman’s religion and the flexibility of her job for reasons unrelated
to fertility expectations. It is likely that different religious denominations are more
prevalent in some regions than others. Since flexibility could potentially have regional
characteristics as well, I add controls for region to equation 2.2. The PSID provides
information on which of the four main regions the respondent lives: Northeast, North
central, West, or South. South is the omitted category. Marital status is included as
a control because women who are not married may have more (or less) freedom in
choosing their occupation. Table 11 reports the estimates of the flexibility regressions
that include education, number of children, region, and a dummy variable indicating
whether the woman is married in the flexibility regression. Married women are more
likely to work part time and work from home than are unmarried women. Region does
not appear to have a strong impact on job flexibility, but women in the Northeast are
in jobs with higher rates of depreciation than are women in the South.
Jehovah’s Witness women are significantly more likely to be in jobs that require
fewer usual hours worked. With the inclusion of control variables, the significance of
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Table 11. Religion as a Predictor of Career Flexibility with Control Variables Added
Flexibility Measure
Fraction Fraction work Average usual Depreciation
part time from home hours worked
Jehovah’s Witness 0.055 0.044 -1.021* -0.002
(0.05) (0.05) (0.44) (0.00)
Pentecostal 0.047 0.042 -0.466 0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.28) (0.00)
Catholic 0.078*** 0.077*** -0.121 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Baptist 0.013 0.008 -0.386* 0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.00)
Protestant 0.012 0.010 -0.020 -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.00)
Jewish 0.052 0.055 0.802* 0.002
(0.03) (0.03) (0.40) (0.00)
Kids 0.036*** 0.037*** -0.165*** -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Married 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.142 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00)
Northeast 0.025 0.022 -0.021 0.002*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00)
North central -0.013 -0.016 0.147 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00)
West 0.023 0.024 0.212 -0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00)
High school graduate -0.179*** -0.182*** 0.411*** 0.003***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00)
Some college -0.242*** -0.246*** 0.844*** 0.005***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.00)
College graduate -0.294*** -0.294*** 1.734*** 0.009***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.16) (0.00)
Advanced degree -0.240*** -0.244*** 1.289*** 0.008***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.00)
Constant 0.350*** 0.342*** 42.215*** 0.043***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00)
Observations 9359 9359 6925 6925
F-statistic 61.218 59.999 16.867 18.454
Notes: * Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1%
level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Average usual hours worked, fraction who
work from home, and fraction part time are all defined for each of the 505 Census
occupation codes from the 1990 1% sample using men between the ages of 25 and 55.
Depreciation is defined for 17 occupational categories as described in the text. The
individual level data is from the PSID for women between the ages 25 and 55.
34
Table 12. Means by Religion for Age at First Birth.
Variable Obs Median Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Baptist 1046 20 21.478 4.368109 13 38
Lutheran 412 22 22.617 4.52498 13 41
Mainline Protestant 836 22 23.428 4.733711 12 42
Catholic 1617 22 23.559 5.112025 13 42
Jewish 127 25 26.15 5.072614 17 39
Notes: Data is from the 1998 General Social Survey. Respondents were asked for
their age at the birth of their first child. The Mainline Protestant category includes
Methodist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran women. Information was not available on
Jehovah’s Witnesses or Pentecostals.
the Catholic dummy variables remains unchanged over Table 8. Baptist women are
significantly less likely to work in jobs with a large number of usual hours worked per
week. Jewish women, on the other hand, are likely to work in careers that require more
hours worked per week. In spite of controlling for children and education, channels
through which differences in religious ideology are likely to manifest themselves, there
are still significant differences in career flexibility by religion.
More highly educated women are generally older when their first child is born.
If women in certain religious denominations postpone childbearing until later in life,
I could be underestimating the number of children these women have, and thus the
impact of fertility expectations on job flexibility for these women. Table 12 examines
the mean age at first birth for women of different denominations. Because the PSID
does not ask women for their age at first birth, the data comes from the 1998 General
Social Survey. Information was not available on whether a woman was Episcopalian,
Pentecostal, or Jehovah’s Witness. Because of this, the Mainline Protestant category
includes Methodist, Presbyterian, and Lutheran women only.
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The average age at first birth for Baptist women is 21.5, which is significantly
younger than women of any other denomination. Mainline Protestant women have
their first child at the average age of 23.2 and Catholic women at 23.6. Jewish women
have their first child at 26 on average, significantly later than women of any other
religious denomination.
Because childbearing appears to occur at different times for different denomina-
tions, I estimate equation 2.2 for women between the ages of 30 and 45 only as an
additional test of robustness. By the age of 30, the oldest child of the average Baptist
woman will be 9 years old and the average Jewish woman’s oldest child will be 4.
Since Baptist women have more children on average than Jewish women, both are
likely to still have children in the household at the age of 45. Table 13 shows the
results of this robustness check. The results are similar to those in Table 8. The loss
of significance in two of the four specifications for Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pente-
costal women is likely due to the small sample; approximately 50% of the original
sample falls outside of this age range. In this restricted age range, Jewish women
are more likely to work from home and work part time than women with no religious
preference.
G. Conclusion
Women are found in systematically different careers than are men. Past research
addressing whether this difference in career types is optimal choice or discrimination
has met with mixed results. One of the issues that makes this problem difficult is the
importance of expectations in the career choice process. If a woman expects to have
a large family or many in-home responsibilities, she may be more likely to choose
a career that is compatible with this choice. Expectations are difficult to measure
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Table 13. Religion as a Predictor of Career Flexibility for Women between the Ages
of 30 and 45.
Flexibility Measure
Fraction Fraction work Average usual Depreciation
part time from home hours worked
Jehovah’s Witness 0.116* 0.107 -1.874** -0.005
(0.06) (0.06) (0.59) (0.00)
Pentecostal 0.071 0.066 -0.974** -0.001
(0.04) (0.04) (0.37) (0.00)
Catholic 0.101*** 0.099*** -0.076 -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.22) (0.00)
Baptist 0.020 0.016 -0.768*** -0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.00)
Mainline Protestant 0.004 0.002 -0.040 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.22) (0.00)
Jewish 0.110* 0.111* 1.685*** 0.006**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.49) (0.00)
Constant 0.205*** 0.194*** 43.191*** 0.048***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.19) (0.00)
Observations 5046 5046 3960 3960
F-statistic 9.370 9.218 11.455 2.228
Notes: *Indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1% level.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Average usual hours worked, fraction who work from home,
and fraction part time are all defined for each of the 505 Census occupation codes from the
1990 1% sample using men between the ages of 25 and 55. Depreciation is defined for 17
occupational categories as described in the text. The individual level data is from the PSID
for women between the ages 30 and 45.
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and are not always fulfilled and ignoring their importance can lead one to incorrect
conclusions about the cause of a woman’s career path.
Different religious groups have different beliefs on the importance of child bearing
and the division of labor within the home. Because of this, fertility expectations
should differ by religious group. If this is the case, including a woman’s religion in
regressions on job attributes should control for fertility expectations and expected
effort expended in household chores. In general, it appears that Jehovah’s Witnesses
are likely to choose the most flexible careers followed by Pentecostal, Catholic, and
Baptist women. There is no significant difference in the flexibility of Protestant
groups which are more likely to stress gender equality and women with no religious
preference. When Jewish women differ from women with no religious preference, they
tend to be in less flexible careers. These results are consistent with the human capital
notion that women are choosing different careers than men rather than being forced
into different job paths.
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CHAPTER III
HOUSEHOLD SPECIALIZATION AND THE MALE MARRIAGE WAGE
PREMIUM
A. Introduction
Empirical results show that married men earn between 10 and 30% higher wages
than their single counterparts, and this wage gap has not been fully explained. The
primary explanations for this phenomenon are employer discrimination towards mar-
ried men, differential selection of men into marriage, or increased productivity as
a result of greater specialization of labor for married men. Most studies focus on
differentiating between the selection and productivity hypotheses, and the existing
literature provides mixed results as to which of these factors is responsible for the
wage premium.
It is possible that the marriage wage premium has not been fully explained
because the key variables, productivity, household specialization, and ability, are
very difficult to define empirically. Many previous studies (Korenman and Neumark
1991, Cornwell and Rupert 1997, Gray 1997, and Hersch and Stratton 2000) control
for unobservable individual factors such as ability by using fixed effects models. Most
of these studies find a marriage premium of between 5 and 10% even after controlling
for individual-specific fixed effects.
Fixed effects estimation is a good solution to the problem of differential selection
into marriage. It is arguably more difficult to find a good control for the degree
of specialization within the home. Previous studies have used a wife’s number of
hours worked as a proxy for specialization. Conflicting results Loh (1996) and Gray
(1997) suggest that hours worked is a weak proxy. Even theoretically, the relationship
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between a wife’s market work and her husband’s household production is ambiguous.
One must consider the income and substitution effects associated with a woman
beginning to work. The income effect says that married men with working wives may
spend less time on household production because household income is greater. On the
other hand, the working wife’s time is more valuable, so her husband may spend more
time on housework than a man whose wife does not work. Using the employment
status of the wife as a proxy for specialization implies that the substitution effect
dominates the income effect; research by South and Spitze (1994) indicates that this
is not the case.
The theoretical uncertainty in the relationship between wife’s employment and
household production suggests that the number of hours worked by the wife may not
be the best proxy for specialization. Hersch and Stratton (2000) use self-reported
information on time spent by men in nine different household production activities as
a measure of household specialization. They find that time spent on housework has a
negative effect on wages, but has no effect on the magnitude of the marriage premium.
Their puzzling conclusion is that neither specialization nor selection can explain the
wage premium. Self-reported assessment of time spent on household tasks may not
fully capture the dynamic of household specialization, and they cannot address the
discrimination hypothesis.
Despite the mixed results, increased productivity through specialization of labor
is still the prevailing explanation for the marriage wage premium. This paper provides
an important contribution to the literature by presenting an alternative measure of
specialization within the home, religious denomination. For most men, religion is
arguably exogenous. Most Americans adopt the religion of the families they were born
into. In addition, certain religious denominations place an emphasis on traditional
gender roles. The statement of faith of the Southern Baptist church, for example,
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says that
A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her
husband even as the church willingly submits to the headship of Christ.
She, being in the image of God as is her husband and thus equal to him,
has the God-given responsibility to respect her husband and to serve as
his helper in managing the household and nurturing the next generation1.
In a study of religious denomination and gender attitudes, Brinkerhoff and MacKie
(1984) investigate differences by denomination in agreement to statements like “when
a husband and wife both work, housework should be shared equally.” They find that
Pentecostals are dramatically less egalitarian than the other denominations studied.
Baptists and Catholics have more defined gender roles than those with no religious
preference.
In this paper, I investigate whether specialization of labor is higher in families
whose religious denomination emphasizes traditional gender roles. I will then examine
whether the marriage premium is higher for men of these religious groups. If men
in more traditional religious denominations enjoy a higher marriage wage premium,
this is evidence that household specialization of labor is an important cause of the
wage premium. Unless the process of selection into marriage differs systematically
with religious denomination, the selection hypothesis cannot explain differing returns
to marriage along denominational lines. This approach will also provide a means to
test the discrimination hypothesis, unless employers prefer married men of certain
religious denominations over others.
1http://www.sbc.net/bfm/bfm2000.asp
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B. Literature Review
Hill (1979) was among the first to thoroughly investigate the marriage wage premium.
She uses the PSID and examines the wage effects of marital status for white men
after carefully controlling for work experience, training, and labor force attachment.
The marriage premium remains around 30% even after these controls for worker
qualifications are introduced. This suggests that marital status is not a proxy for
differential work experience, on-the-job training, or labor force attachment and is
instead due to increased productivity through marriage.
Korenman and Neumark (1991) also examine whether marriage makes men more
productive. They use the National Longitudinal Study of Young Men as well as com-
pany personnel data. The NLSYM provides evidence against the selection hypothesis.
In the cross-sectional analysis, the marriage premium is 16.6%. After fixed effects esti-
mation, the marriage premium is 14.8%. Ninety-two percent of the premium remains
after controlling for individual fixed-effects. The personnel data reveals that married
men are found in higher job grades than single men and that this is the cause of their
higher wages. Married men are also more likely to be given high performance ratings
which increase the probability of promotion. The findings from the personnel data
could be consistent with employer discrimination, but Korenman and Neumark do
not investigate this possibility.
Cornwell and Rupert (1997) perform the same analysis as in Korenman and
Neumark but extend the panel from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men
by 5 years and include job tenure as an explanatory variable. These relatively minor
changes lead to a completely different conclusion as to the source of the marriage
wage premium; they find that the marriage premium from the fixed effects model is
no more than 5% to 7%. They also construct a “to-be-married” variable and find
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that men who are not married in 1971 but marry sometime during the sample earn
at least as much as those who are already married. This, too, is evidence against the
productivity hypothesis. Their sample size is small (666 men) and confined to men
who were between the ages of 19 and 29 in 1971 and therefore may not generalize to
other cohorts of men.
Loh (1996) also uses a small age range and concludes that the marriage premium
is not due to differences in productivity. His sample includes men in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth Labor Market Experience who were between the ages
of 14 and 22 in 1990. He uses the wife’s labor force participation as a proxy for
specialization within the home and finds that the marriage premium does not diminish
when this control is added. He also examines the self-employed; if marriage makes
men more productive in general, self-employed married men should make more money
than self-employed single men. Loh finds that self-employed married men earn less
than their single counterparts which is clearly contrary to the productivity hypothesis.
The productivity hypothesis also suggests that men who co-habit prior to marriage
should earn a higher wage premium than those who did not. This is because partners
who live together prior to marriage gain information on the other’s strengths and
weaknesses and can use this information to specialize more efficiently. Currently
married men who lived with their wives before marriage receive the same premium
as married men who did not live with their spouse prior to marriage. Loh takes this
as evidence against the specialization hypothesis.
If the marriage premium is due to selection of higher ability men into marriage,
marriage and wages are jointly endogenous. Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) use instru-
mental variables estimation in the 1977 PSID to control for this possible endogeneity.
They use parent’s educational attainment, number of siblings, and dummy variables
for race, urban upbringing, whether the respondent was Catholic, and the presence
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of older siblings as instruments for marriage. The marriage wage premium in the IV
estimation is unchanged over the OLS estimate of around 45%, but becomes insignif-
icant due to a large increase in standard error. Nakosteen and Zimmer attribute this
loss of significance to evidence for the selection hypothesis. Subsequent researchers
have questioned this result because of the difficulty in finding valid instruments for
marriage and the imprecision of their findings.
It is possible that the conflicting results from the above studies are due to the
changing nature of the marriage premium over time. The marriage wage premium fell
by more than 40 percent in the 1980s. Between 1976 and 1980, married men earned
11% more than never-married men. By the 1989-1993 period, married men earned
only 6% more than their single counterparts. Gray (1997) uses National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Men data from 1976, 1978, and 1980 and National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth data from 1989, 1991, and 1993 to examine the changing marriage
wage premium. In the early period, the marriage premium appears to be mainly a
result of increased productivity of married men. In the 1989-1993 period, however,
the fixed effects regressions show no marriage wage premium, evidence that the wage
gap during this time period is attributable to selection. These results suggests that
the productivity effects of marriage have declined.
This decline could be due to decreased specialization or to diminished returns to
specialization within the home. In order to shed light on this issue, Gray adds the
wife’s labor market hours to the regression as a proxy for the degree of specialization.
Because the wife’s labor market hours are arguably endogenous to her husband’s
wages, he uses instrumental variables estimation. Conditional on appropriate instru-
ments, Gray finds that the “decline in the productivity effects of marriage results from
less specialization taking place in marriages rather than any decrease in the return to
specialization.” (pg 502).
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Hersch and Stratton (2000) put a unique spin on the problem. They use panel
data from the National Survey of Families and Households which includes information
on time spent in nine different household production activities. They find that time
spent on housework has a negative effect on wages, but has no effect on the magnitude
of the marriage premium. Including fixed effects lessens the marriage premium from
11% to 9.4%, indicating that selection matters, but explains little of the wage gap.
Their results mirror the mixed messages received from the rest of the literature. The
marriage premium is not primarily due to selection. Marriage appears to have made
these men more productive, but not through household specialization. They suggest
that the premium could be due to preferential treatment from employers or because
of changes in men’s behavior because of greater stability due to marriage. We still
have much to learn about the effect of marriage on wages.
C. Data
I use data from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal data set collected by the University of Michigan.
This is an ideal data set for this analysis because it has been used extensively in the
literature on the male marriage premium, includes questions on a respondent’s reli-
gious preference, and allows me to identify many different religious denominations.
The denominations I consider are Pentecostal, Catholic, Baptist, Jewish, and Main-
line Protestant, which includes Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, and
“Other Protestant.” The reference category is individuals whose religious preference
is “none, atheist, agnostic.” There are 686 individuals who do not fall into these
categories and who have been omitted from the sample. Most of these men did not
answer the religion question or responded that their religious preference was “other”.
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Individuals who fell into the category of “Other non-Christian: Muslim, Rastafarian,
etc” and those who simply responded that they were “Christian” were also omitted.
Because wage and religious preference information is only available for heads of
household and their wives, the sample is restricted to men between the ages of 25 and
55 who are the head of the household. The PSID is set up such that if an adult male
is present in the household, he is considered the head. I restrict the sample to include
only men between the ages of 25 and 55. Men younger than 25 are not included
because of the possibility that they are combining school and work, which would
likely affect wages. I also exclude men who are nearing retirement. Marriage histories
are complete only for men who have been married less than 3 times, so the sample
is limited to this group. Less than 5% of the sample is affected by this restriction
and results are robust to their inclusion. The marriage variable is defined as men
who are legally married at the time of the interview. The PSID occasionally asks
whether men are cohabitating at the time of the survey. Because this information is
not available in all years, it is not considered in this paper. Because religious groups
differ in their stance on cohabitation prior to marriage, interpretation of this variable
would be difficult.
Wages are defined as total annual labor earnings of the respondent divided by his
annual hours of work on all jobs, including overtime. Wage data was top and bottom
coded in each year. Wages that fell below the second percentile were assumed to be
equal to the wage level at the second percentile. Wages that were above the ninety-
eighth percentile were set equal to the wage level at the 98th percentile. Men who did
not work in a given year are excluded from the analysis. The natural log of wages
is used in all regression specifications. Experience is defined as age minus years of
education minus 6.
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D. Empirical Results
Table 14 gives summary statistics at the time of first entry into the sample. The
“Single” category includes never married men as well as those who are divorced or
widowed. Both wages and non-wage characteristics differ for single and married
men. Married men are 2 years older on average than their non-married counterparts.
Because of the age difference, Table 14 includes age-adjusted differences between
married and single men. Single men have an hourly wage of $11.90 and married men
of $13.73. Married men have approximately 2 more years of experience than single
men on average, but this is due almost exclusively to the differences in their ages.
Married men also work significantly more hours than single men, 134 hours per year
after adjusting for age. Married and single men have very similar years of education
on average. Men in the sample who are married have been married for an average
of ten and a half years. Approximately 27% of men in the sample are Baptist, 24%
are Protestant, 34% are Catholic, 2% are Pentecostal, 2% Jewish, and 10% have no
religious preference. There are differences in the composition of religious preference
by marital status as well. Catholic men in the sample are significantly more likely
to be married while Baptist men and atheist, agnostic, and men with no religious
preference are more likely to be single.
Table 15 compares variable means by marital status and religious group. There
are significant differences both across religious denomination and by marital status.
Jewish men have the highest hourly wage regardless of marital status, but married
Jewish men make nearly $1.82 per hour more than single Jewish men. After adjusting
for age, married Baptist men have the largest wage advantage of their single coun-
terparts and work 140 hours more than single Baptist men. Married Jewish men, on
the other hand, work almost 400 more hours per year than single Jews. There were
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Table 14. Summary Statistics at Time of First Entry into Sample
Married Single
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Age-adjusted Std. Err
difference
Age 36.396 8.104 34.198 7.911 - -
Number of children 1.496 1.269 0.544 1.015 0.958 0.042
Hourly wage 13.726 8.611 11.906 8.229 1.444 0.286
Experience 17.782 8.877 15.658 8.623 -0.146 0.100
Annual hours worked 2190 654.9 2056 758.6 134.3 22.9
Years of Education 12.614 2.998 12.539 2.715 0.146 0.010
Years Married 10.253 8.583 0.000 0.000 8.931 0.204
Hours of housework per week 7.782 7.891 8.173 8.145 -0.399 0.270
Proportion Jewish 0.020 0.139 0.016 0.124 0.003 0.005
Proportion Pentecostal 0.028 0.165 0.017 0.128 0.013 0.005
Proportion atheist/agnostic 0.088 0.284 0.151 0.359 -0.059 0.010
Proportion Protestant 0.250 0.433 0.218 0.413 0.029 0.015
Proportion Catholic 0.355 0.479 0.280 0.449 0.073 0.016
Proportion Baptist 0.259 0.438 0.319 0.466 -0.059 0.015
Observations 4693 1083
Notes: Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the PSID and includes men between the
ages of 25 and 55. The wage is defined as the total annual labor income of the respondent
divided by annual hours worked.
not large differences in education by marital status for any of the religious groups.
Married men do fewer hours of housework on average than single men; Jewish men
have the largest average reduction of housework hours per week at approximately 2
hours per week.
Table 15 suggests that housework behavior and the marital wage premium dif-
fers by religious denomination. While cross-sectional variation provides interesting
information, we would really like to know how an individual’s wages and in-home
responsibilities change upon marriage. As a baseline specification, I estimate the
following equation for the sample as a whole:
lnWit = βXit + δMarriedit + Ai + εit (3.1)
where lnWit is the log of the hourly wage for individual i at time t, Xit is a vector
of observable individual characteristics expected to influence the wage, Marriedit is a
dummy variable indicating whether the individual was legally married in a particular
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Table 15. Variable Means by Religious Denomination
Baptist
Variable Married Single Age-adjusted difference Std. Err
Hourly Wage 12.464 10.207 2.104 0.453
Experience 17.417 16.173 -0.381 0.130
Annual hours worked 2145.751 2008.462 139.316 43.185
Years of Education 12.605 12.301 0.381 0.130
Hours of housework 7.079 8.430 -1.322 0.485
Catholic
Variable Married Single Age-adjusted difference Std. Err
Hourly Wage 13.748 12.832 0.562 0.563
Experience 18.884 15.845 0.064 0.227
Annual hours worked 2194.086 2020.381 176.594 39.553
Years of Education 11.822 12.073 -0.064 0.227
Hours of housework 8.675 8.386 0.250 0.536
Protestant
Variable Married Single Age-adjusted difference Std. Err
Hourly Wage 14.467 12.708 1.338 0.579
Experience 17.240 15.898 -0.348 0.170
Annual hours worked 2259.389 2152.994 102.532 50.095
Years of Education 13.506 13.127 0.348 0.170
Hours of housework 7.410 8.291 -0.913 0.515
Jewish
Variable Married Single Age-adjusted difference Std. Err
Hourly Wage 23.149 17.437 1.827 3.287
Experience 17.699 6.647 1.011 0.024
Annual hours worked 2261.906 2137.447 395.683 197.479
Years of Education 15.667 15.706 0.078 0.539
Hours of housework 5.815 7.824 -1.979 1.817
Pentecostal
Variable Married Single Age-adjusted difference Std. Err
Hourly Wage 11.359 10.822 1.052 1.622
Experience 16.870 18.389 0.535 0.617
Annual hours worked 2083.261 2066.822 2.426 156.467
Years of Education 11.527 11.889 -0.535 0.617
Hours of housework 8.146 7.222 0.965 2.016
Notes: Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the PSID and includes men between
the ages of 25 and 55. The wage is defined as the total annual labor income of the
respondent divided by annual hours worked.
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year, and A represents any time-invariant, unobserved individual characteristics such
as ability or physical attractiveness. Fixed effects estimation allows for the removal of
these time-invariant, unobserved individual characteristics and consistent estimation
of the returns to marriage. Because of the age restriction, years of education for an
individual in the sample are not likely to change over time. Years of education is not
significant in any specification and thus not included in X. All results are robust
to its inclusion. Experience is included in X in all specifications as a joined spline.
Returns to experience are allowed to differ between the first 15 years of experience,
the second 15 years, and any experience after 30 years. Murphy and Welch (1990)
show that returns to experience vary greatly over the span of a career. Career growth
for high school graduates in the first 10 years of their career is 54%, growth during
the next 15 years is 18%, and the decline in the subsequent 15 years is 5%. Using a
typical quadratic in experience understates early career wage growth by almost 50%
and understates middle career wage growth by around 30%. The joined spline allows
wage growth to differ over these career periods.
Table 16 contains the results of estimating equation 3.1. Married men earn about
6% more than single men after controlling for experience. Consistent with research on
age-earnings profiles, the returns to experience are greatest during the first 15 years
of a career and decline after this point.
The heart of the productivity hypothesis is that marriage allows for increased
specialization of labor which allows men to devote more time and effort to market
work, thus earning higher wages. While self-reported hours of housework per week do
not fully capture specialization of labor, it should shed some light on whether there
are differences by religion in housework responsibilities upon marriage. I estimate the
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Table 16. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Marriage Wage Premium
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Married 0.055 (0.015)
Early career experience 0.076 (0.003)
Mid-career experience 0.038 (0.002)
Late career experience 0.025 (0.005)
Intercept 1.315 (0.036)
N 27575
F (5787,21787) 452.531
Notes: All coefficients are significant at the 1%
level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the
PSID and includes men between the ages of 25 and
55. The wage is defined as the natural log of the to-
tal annual labor income of the respondent divided
by annual hours worked. Returns to experience are
allowed to differ between the first 15 years of ex-
perience, the second 15 years, and any experience
after 30 years.
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following equation:
Houseworkit = βXit + δMarriedit ∗Denominationi + Ai + εit. (3.2)
where Housework is defined in two ways: the weekly hours of housework done by the
head of the household and the fraction of housework done by the head of household.
Fraction of housework done by head of household is included because total household
production likely changes with marriage. If home production is positively related to
the number of hours spent on housework, a man might increase his housework by 1
hour per week upon marriage but benefit from a 10 hour increase in time allocated
to total household production. Simply looking at the number of hours of housework
he does per week will not capture this, but the percentage of housework he does will.
Both of these could arguably affect wages. The X vector includes controls for number
of children in the household and number of years married. I include a control for the
number of children in the household because fertility differs across religious groups,
and time spent in child care is included in reported hours of housework. Years married
is included because specialization within the home is expected to increase over the
life of a marriage.
Table 17 contains the results of the estimation of equation 3.2. Men with no
religious preference do significantly more hours of housework after marriage, but do
a significantly smaller fraction of total housework. This pattern is true for Pente-
costal men as well; their fraction of total housework decreases significantly, but they
do (insignificantly) more hours of housework after marriage. Baptist, Catholic, and
Protestant men do significantly fewer hours of housework and a smaller fraction of
total housework. As expected, total hours of housework increases when children are
added to the family. This increase falls primarily on the mother, however, as frac-
tion of housework done by the head of household decreases with additional children.
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Table 17. Fixed Effects Regressions of Housework Done by Head of Household
Hours of housework of Fraction of housework of
head of household head of household
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Married 1.362** -0.420***
(0.51) (0.01)
Married*Baptist -1.758** -0.047**
(0.61) (0.02)
Married*Catholic -1.742** -0.044**
(0.62) (0.02)
Married*Protestant -1.391* -0.093***
(0.61) (0.02)
Married*Jewish -1.718 0.032
(1.19) (0.03)
Married*Pentecostal 1.451 -0.125*
(1.95) (0.05)
Number of Children 0.263*** -0.040***
(0.06) (0.00)
Years married -0.083*** -0.004***
(0.01) (0.00)
Intercept 8.073*** 0.850***
(0.19) (0.01)
N 27369 26972
F-statistic 8.153 1531.210
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1%
level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages
of 25 and 55.
Controls are also included for number of years married. The longer a couple has been
married, the less time the husband spends on housework.
If changes in housework responsibilities capture some dimension of specialization
of labor, Table 17 suggests that Protestant, Catholic, and Baptist men should enjoy
a significant marriage premium. It is unclear what to expect from Jewish and Pente-
costal men. Brinkerhoff and MacKie’s (1984) findings suggest that Pentecostal men
will benefit most from specialization of labor, followed by Baptists, Catholics, and
Protestants. To investigate whether the marriage wage premium differs by religious
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denomination, I estimate the following equation:
lnWit = βXit + δMarriedit ∗Denominationi + Ai + εit. (3.3)
Fixed effects estimates of equation 3.3 can be found in Table 18. Men with no reli-
gious preference do not experience an increase in wages upon marriage while Jewish,
Catholic, Baptist, Protestant, and Pentecostal men do. In comparison to the 6%
marriage wage premium in Table 16, these premiums are very large. With 90% confi-
dence, Baptist men receive a wage premium over men with no religious preference of
between 0.61% and 19%, Catholic men between 3% and 23%, Protestant men 5.4%
to 25%, and Jewish men 3.3% to 45%. Pentecostal men receive the largest wage pre-
mium with a range of 37% to an incredible 138%. This is consistent with Brinkerhoff
and MacKie’s finding that Pentecostal families are the least egalitarian.
It is possible that the full benefits of specialization of labor within the household
are not realized the moment one gets married. Korenman and Neumark (1991) find
that the effects of marriage appear gradually over time rather than from a one time
intercept shift upon marriage. If couples get better at specializing in the household
over time, we would expect a significant growth in marriage premium with number of
years married. In Table 19, I interact years married with religious denomination so
that wage growth can differ by religion. There is still a significant jump in wages at
marriage for Baptist, Catholic, Protestant, and Pentecostal men; the point estimates
are similar to those in Table 18 but are higher for all groups but Catholic men.
These men appear to benefit from marriage immediately, as opposed to gaining as
the marriage ages. There is no longer an intercept shift for Jewish men; however, they
seem to benefit from marriage in the form of a larger growth rate, approximately 2%
per year married. The average Jewish man in the sample has been married for 12.7
years which implies a wage premium of 24%. The wage premium may diminish over
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Table 18. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums by Religious Denomi-
nation
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Married -0.051 (0.043)
Married*Baptist 0.091∗ (0.051)
Married*Catholic 0.117∗∗ (0.052)
Married*Protestant 0.137∗∗∗ (0.051)
Married*Jewish 0.201∗∗ (0.102)
Married*Pentecostal 0.591∗∗∗ (0.167)
Early career experience 0.076∗∗∗ (0.003)
Mid-career experience 0.038∗∗∗ (0.002)
Late career experience 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
Intercept 1.305∗∗∗ (0.036)
N 27575
F (5792,21782) 203.222
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, **
at the 5%, *** at the 1% level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001
waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages of 25 and
55. Returns to experience are allowed to differ between the first
15 years of experience, the second 15 years, and any experience
after 30 years.
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time for Baptist men.
The argument for increased wage growth as a marriage progresses is that over
time partners gain information on the other’s strengths and weaknesses and can use
this information to specialize more efficiently. Perhaps rigidly defined gender roles
in certain denominations preclude these gains over time. If there are denominational
norms in the kind of jobs that a wife takes over upon marriage and very little deviation
from these norms, most if not all of the benefit of marriage would be realized at the
moment the marriage begins. Perhaps Pentecostal women, for example, immediately
begin cooking meals, doing laundry, and washing dishes upon marriage because that
is a cultural norm in the denomination. There are not additional benefits over time
because traditional “women’s work” does not change. It may be that if the woman
is more well suited to changing the oil in the car than her husband, the household
never benefits from this because she never takes on this responsibility.
E. Tests of Robustness
Table 20 examines the changes in the magnitude of the wage premium for different
religious groups when additional control variables are added. The specification in the
first column of Table 20 is the same as in Table 19, but controls for 9 occupational
categories are added. If men of different religious groups have differing tastes or
access to certain careers, failing to control for occupation will lead to biased estimates.
Household service occupations are the omitted category. Results are very similar to
those in Table 19. Men with no religious preference continue to experience no increase
in wage levels or wage growth with marriage. The large premium for Pentecostal men
persists; the wage premium they earn is 84% higher than that of men with no religious
preference after controlling for observable characteristics. There remains a significant
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Table 19. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums
by Religious Denomination: Premium Allowed to Vary
with Years Married
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Married -0.068 (0.047)
Married*Baptist 0.121∗∗ (0.056)
Married*Catholic 0.099∗ (0.057)
Married*Protestant 0.140∗∗ (0.056)
Married*Jewish 0.091 (0.109)
Married*Pentecostal 0.597∗∗∗ (0.169)
Years married 0.005 (0.004)
Years married*Baptist -0.009∗ (0.005)
Years married*Catholic 0.001 (0.005)
Years married*Protestant -0.002 (0.005)
Years married*Jewish 0.021∗∗ (0.008)
Years married*Pentecostal 0.004 (0.010)
Early career experience 0.074∗∗∗ (0.003)
Mid-career experience 0.036∗∗∗ (0.002)
Late career experience 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
Intercept 1.320∗∗∗ (0.037)
N 27452
F (5771,21680) 123.041
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, **
at the 5%, *** at the 1% level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001
waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages of 25 and 55.
Returns to experience are allowed to differ between the first 15 years
of experience, the second 15 years, and any experience after 30 years.
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wage premium for Baptist men of 11.5% and Protestant men of around 13% over men
with no religious preference. Jewish men continue to experience a 2% wage growth
for each additional year married.
In column 2, I add controls for hours of housework per week and number of
children to the specification in column 1. While Hersch and Stratton (2000) find that
housework has a negative effect on wages, I do not find a significant effect of hours of
housework per week on wages. The addition of children to the family has a positive
effect on wages; perhaps because men commit more effort to their jobs with the added
responsibility of providing for a family. Coefficient magnitudes are nearly identical
to those in column 1. The third column of Table 20 includes controls for experience,
experience2, experience3, and experience4 instead of the spline in experience. Again,
coefficient estimates change very little and the large wage premium for Pentecostal
men persists.
Annual hours of work also clearly differs by religious denomination and has an
effect on wages. Table 21 investigates how including annual hours worked affects the
coefficient estimates in Table 19 and Table 20. The specification in the first column of
Table 21 is the same as in Table 19, but controls for annual hours worked have been
added. The inclusion of hours of work has very little effect on the coefficient estimates.
Pentecostal men still enjoy a large and significant wage premium. Baptist, Catholic,
and Protestant men also experience an intercept shift upon marriage. Married Jewish
men do not have a significant intercept shift, but benefit from marriage in terms of
higher wage growth. In the second column of Table 21, I control for 9 occupational
categories. The magnitude of the estimates is similar to those in column 1. The large
premium for Pentecostal men persists; they earn an average premium of 86% after
controlling for observable characteristics. There remains a significant wage premium
for Baptist and Protestant men. Jewish men continue to experience a 2% wage growth
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Table 20. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums by Religious Denom-
ination: Controls for Occupation, Number of Children, Housework, and
Additional Experience Added
Variable Coef (S.E) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Married -0.044 (0.05) -0.053 (0.05) -0.062 (0.05)
Married*Baptist 0.109* (0.06) 0.107* (0.06) 0.115** (0.06)
Married*Catholic 0.080 (0.06) 0.078 (0.06) 0.085 (0.06)
Married*Protestant 0.122** (0.06) 0.118** (0.06) 0.123** (0.06)
Married*Jewish 0.058 (0.11) 0.065 (0.11) 0.029 (0.11)
Married*Pentecostal 0.612*** (0.17) 0.600*** (0.17) 0.616*** (0.17)
Years married 0.004 (0.00) 0.004 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00)
Yearsmarried*Baptist -0.009* (0.00) -0.008* (0.00) -0.009* (0.00)
Years married*Catholic 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Years married*Protestant -0.003 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00)
Years married*Jewish 0.022*** (0.01) 0.022*** (0.01) 0.021** (0.01)
Years married*Pentecostal -0.005 (0.01) -0.004 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01)
Early experience 0.074*** (0.00) 0.073*** (0.00)
Mid-career experience 0.037*** (0.00) 0.038*** (0.00)
Late career experience 0.026*** (0.00) 0.028*** (0.00)
Experience 0.159*** (0.02)
Experience2 -0.006*** (0.00)
Experience3 0.000** (0.00
Experience4 -0.000* (0.00)
Professional, Technical 0.095*** (0.03) 0.092*** (0.03) 0.088*** (0.03)
Managers 0.084*** (0.03) 0.082** (0.03) 0.080** (0.03)
Sales 0.050 (0.03) 0.050 (0.03) 0.047 (0.03)
Clerical 0.046 (0.03) 0.042 (0.03) 0.044 (0.03)
Craftsmen 0.093*** (0.02) 0.092*** (0.02) 0.091*** (0.02)
Operatives 0.090*** (0.03) 0.089** (0.03) 0.087** (0.03)
Transport Operatives 0.070** (0.03) 0.062** (0.03) 0.062** (0.03)
Laborers 0.074*** (0.03) 0.072*** (0.03) 0.070** (0.03)
Farmers -0.056 (0.06) -0.057 (0.06) -0.061 (0.06)
Number of children 0.015** (0.01) 0.010* (0.01)
Weekly housework hours 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)
Intercept 1.252*** (0.04) 1.257*** (0.04) 0.901*** (0.08)
N 26536 26460 26460
F-statistic 78.813 72.636 71.483
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at the 1%
level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages
of 25 and 55. Annual hours worked has been divided by a thousand. Household service
occupations are the omitted occupational category.
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for each additional year married. In column 3, controls for hours of housework per
week and number of children are added to the specification in column 2. Coefficient
magnitudes change very little. Pentecostal men still experience a 83% wage premium
at marriage, and Jewish men an average of 2% wage growth per year married. The
fourth column of Table 21 includes controls for experience, experience2, experience3,
and experience4 instead of the spline in experience. Coefficients change very little.
It is possible that age at first marriage differs by religious denomination. If most
men in a particular denomination marry before the age of 25, the wage premium for
that denomination will be identified only on the men who marry later than average,
which may not be a representative sample. Table 22 shows the mean and median age
at first marriage by religious denomination. Pentecostal men marry earliest, with a
median age at first marriage of 22.5. Protestant and Baptist men are 23 on average
at their first marriage, and Catholic men and men with no religious preference are
24. Jewish men marry the latest, with a median age at first marriage of 25.
Because men of some denominations marry earlier than others, I estimate equa-
tion 3.3 for men between the ages of 20 and 55 as an additional test of robustness.
This expanded age range includes over 75% of all marriages in the sample. Because
of the possibility that some of these men are combining school with work, an indi-
cator variable for being currently enrolled in school is included in this specification.
The results of this estimation can be found in Table 23 and are very similar to the
results in Table 18. Men with no religious preference do not experience an increase
in wages upon marriage while Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Pentecostal men do.
There is no wage premium for Baptist men in the expanded age range. While the
coefficient magnitudes are slightly smaller in this specification, there is still an aver-
age wage premium over men with no religious preference of 11.63% for Catholic men,
14% for Protestant men, 30.34% for Jewish men, and 47.55% for Pentecostal men.
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Table 21. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums by Religious Denom-
ination: Controls for Annual Hours Worked, Occupation, Number of Chil-
dren, Housework, and Additional Experience Added
Variable Coef (S.E) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.) Coef (S.E.)
Married -0.063 (0.04) -0.047 (0.05) -0.055 (0.05) -0.065 (0.05)
Married*Baptist 0.112** (0.05) 0.109** (0.05) 0.104* (0.05) 0.113** (0.05)
Married*Catholic 0.114** (0.05) 0.090 (0.06) 0.087 (0.06) 0.094* (0.06)
Married*Protestant 0.122** (0.05) 0.108** (0.05) 0.101* (0.05) 0.105* (0.05)
Married*Jewish 0.113 (0.11) 0.081 (0.11) 0.087 (0.11) 0.046 (0.11)
Married*Pentecostal 0.607*** (0.16) 0.619*** (0.16) 0.606*** (0.16) 0.622*** (0.16)
Years married 0.005 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00) 0.004 (0.00) 0.005 (0.00)
Years married*Baptist -0.008 (0.00) -0.007 (0.00) -0.007 (0.00) -0.007 (0.00)
Years married*Catholic 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00)
Years married*Protestant -0.003 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00)
Years married*Jewish 0.020*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.021*** (0.01) 0.020** (0.01)
Years married*Pentecostal 0.010 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01) 0.002 (0.01) 0.001 (0.01)
Annual hours worked -0.261*** (0.01) -0.269*** (0.01) -0.271*** (0.01) -0.271*** (0.01)
Early career experience 0.078*** (0.00) 0.078*** (0.00) 0.076*** (0.0 0)
Mid-career experience 0.037*** (0.00) 0.038*** (0.00) 0.040*** (0.00)
Late career experience 0.022*** (0.00) 0.024*** (0.00) 0.026*** (0.00)
Experience 0.171*** (0.02)
Experience2 -0.006*** (0.00)
Experience3 0.000*** (0.00)
Experience4 -0.000** (0.00)
Professional, Technical 0.110*** (0.03) 0.107*** (0.03) 0.104*** (0.03)
Managers 0.109*** (0.02) 0.107*** (0.02) 0.105*** (0.02)
Sales 0.056* (0.03) 0.056* (0.03) 0.053* (0.03)
Clerical 0.050* (0.03) 0.047* (0.03) 0.049* (0.03)
Craftsmen 0.113*** (0.02) 0.112*** (0.02) 0.111*** (0.02)
Operatives 0.101*** (0.03) 0.099*** (0.03) 0.097*** (0.03)
Transport Operatives 0.084*** (0.03) 0.075*** (0.03) 0.075*** (0.03)
Laborers 0.058** (0.03) 0.056** (0.03) 0.054** (0.03)
Farmers 0.022 (0.05) 0.019 (0.05) 0.016 (0.05)
Number of children 0.017*** (0.01) 0.012** (0.01)
Weekly housework hours -0.000 (0.00) -0.000 (0.00)
Intercept 1.829*** (0.04) 1.782*** (0.04) 1.798*** (0.04) 1.404*** (0.08)
N 27452 26536 26460 26460
F-statistic 229.144 149.463 138.739 135.840
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, *** at
the 1% level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the PSID and includes men
between the ages of 25 and 55. Annual hours worked has been divided by a thousand.
Household service occupations are the omitted occupational category.
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Table 22. Mean and Median Age at First Marriage by Religious Preference
Group Obs Median Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
Pentecostal 130 22.5 23.900 0.451 5.141
Protestant 1196 23 23.890 0.136 4.696
Baptist 1336 23 23.994 0.146 5.325
Catholic 1841 24 24.460 0.112 4.786
None 551 24 24.895 0.227 5.322
Jewish 91 25 26.077 0.456 4.349
Notes: Data is from the 1991 to 2001 waves of the PSID and includes
men between the ages of 25 and 55.
As expected, men who are combining school with work earn lower wages.
Fixed effects estimates do not allow for the consideration of variables that do
not vary over time. Because of this, education in fixed effects estimation is only
identified from men who get more education while they are in the sample. Men of
different religious denominations have different levels of education on average. Wage
premiums vary with education, and it is possible that the institution of marriage
functions differently for men with different levels of education. To investigate these
issues, I estimate equation 3.3 separately for men with less than a college education
and men with at least a college education.
Table 24 contains the results of estimating equation 3.3 for men with less than a
college education. Men with no religious preference and less than a college education
earn significantly lower wages after marriage. Married Baptist men with less than a
college education earn a 12.19% higher premium upon marriage than men with no
religious preference. Pentecostal men in this education category earn an average wage
premium of 108%!
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Table 23. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums
by Religious Denomination for Men between the Ages
of 20 and 55.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Married -0.047 (0.038)
Married*Baptist 0.072 (0.046)
Married*Catholic 0.110∗∗ (0.047)
Married*Protestant 0.131∗∗∗ (0.047)
Married*Jewish 0.265∗∗∗ (0.097)
Married*Pentecostal 0.389∗∗∗ (0.130)
Early experience 0.079∗∗∗ (0.002)
Mid-career experience 0.038∗∗∗ (0.002)
Late career experience 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
Student -0.101∗∗ (0.046)
Intercept 1.294∗∗∗ (0.031)
N 29173
F (6061,23111) 221.98
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, **
at the 5%, *** at the 1% level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001
waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages of 20 and 55.
Returns to experience are allowed to differ between the first 15 years
of experience, the second 15 years, and any experience after 30 years.
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Table 24. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums
by Religious Denomination for Men with Less Than a
College Education.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Married -0.087∗ (0.049)
Married*Baptist 0.115∗∗ (0.058)
Married*Catholic 0.141∗∗ (0.060)
Married*Protestant 0.170∗∗∗ (0.060)
Married*Jewish 0.023 (0.260)
Married*Pentecostal 0.732∗∗∗ (0.176)
Early experience 0.066∗∗∗ (0.003)
Mid-career experience 0.037∗∗∗ (0.002)
Late career experience 0.027∗∗∗ (0.005)
Intercept 1.278∗∗∗ (0.047)
N 20516
F (4542,15973) 116.709
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, **
at the 5%, *** at the 1% level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001
waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages of 25 and 55.
Returns to experience are allowed to differ between the first 15 years
of experience, the second 15 years, and any experience after 30 years.
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The estimates for men with at least a college education are found in Table 25.
Interestingly, there is not a significant marriage wage premium by religion for these
men. Gains in wages by religious denomination appear for less educated men only. A
possible explanation for this phenomenon lies in the difference in physical demands
of the jobs of college educated men and non-college educated men. The jobs of less
educated men tend to require more physical exertion. Perhaps having the effort saved
by having a wife who cooks and cleans at home is more valuable to these men who
expend a great deal of physical effort on the job.
F. Conclusion
The cause of the male marriage wage premium is not fully understood. The pre-
vailing hypotheses are differences in productivity due to increased specialization of
labor within the home, selection of higher quality men into marriage, or employer
discrimination. Differentiating between these hypotheses is difficult in part because
a suitable proxy for household specialization is hard to find.
The advantage from marriage that a man will enjoy depends in large part on
how many of the household responsibilities his wife is willing to take on. Religious
teaching is a powerful means of shaping gender attitudes and expectations of the
duties of a husband and wife. Pentecostal men and women, for example, were not as
likely to agree that “when a husband and wife both work, housework should be shared
equally” as were Catholic husbands and wives (Brinkerhoff and MacKie 1984). Fixed
effects estimation shows that Baptist, Catholic, and Protestant men have significant
reductions in housework responsibilities after marriage. These facts suggest that if
household specialization is the primary cause of the marriage wage premium, men in
these denominations should benefit more from marriage than men with no religious
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Table 25. Fixed Effects Estimates of Marriage Wage Premiums
by Religious Denomination for Men with at Least a
College Education.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Married 0.082 (0.088)
Married*Baptist 0.006 (0.118)
Married*Catholic 0.021 (0.108)
Married*Protestant -0.009 (0.103)
Married*Jewish 0.047 (0.134)
Married*Pentecostal -0.518 (0.526)
Early experience 0.090∗∗∗ (0.004)
Mid-career experience 0.042∗∗∗ (0.003)
Late career experience -0.027 (0.022)
Intercept 1.591∗∗∗ (0.057)
N 7059
F (1273,5785) 89.154
Notes: * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, **
at the 5%, *** at the 1% level. Data is from the 1991 to 2001
waves of the PSID and includes men between the ages of 25 and 55.
Returns to experience are allowed to differ between the first 15 years
of experience, the second 15 years, and any experience after 30 years.
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preference.
When a Pentecostal man marries, his wages increase dramatically, even after
controlling for a number of observable characteristics. Catholic men, Protestant men,
and Baptist men also benefit from large wage increases after marriage, although the
benefit to Baptist men may diminish over time. The wage premium for Jewish men
appears to be in the form of increased wage growth. There is no reason to expect that
employers would prefer married Pentecostal men to single Pentecostal men more than
they prefer married Catholic men to single Catholic men, so discrimination cannot
explain these findings. Fixed effects estimation removes time-invariant individual
characteristics, and it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which selection into marriage
differs across religious denomination by a characteristic that varies over time. These
significant differences in marriage premium by religious denomination provide new
support for the productivity hypothesis.
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CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATING RISK AVERSION AT THE MICRO LEVEL USING LABOR
SUPPLY DATA
A. Introduction
Why do some people enjoy bungee-jumping while others do not? Why do some indi-
viduals hold extensive insurance portfolios? It is intuitive to attribute these differences
between people to their individual preferences for risk, a concept that is appealing
but hard to quantify. Kenneth Arrow (1965) and John Pratt’s (1964) coefficient of
relative risk aversion (RRA) has been the standard risk measure since the mid 1960s.
Since that time, theorists and empiricists have studied this measure, each grappling
with their own set of problems. Theorists have called expected utility theory into
question based on various violations of its predictions and axioms (Allais Paradox,
for example), but a dominant alternative theory has not emerged. Many interest-
ing questions about individual risk preferences have not been addressed empirically,
likely because the information necessary to compute risk aversion is not available in
traditional surveys. Most previous studies of individual risk preferences have been
limited to the rare instances where consumption or portfolio data is available. These
limitations remain an impediment to progress on topics such as how risk preferences
are formed, how they vary in the population, and how they affect decision making
and behavior.
Raj Chetty (2006) uses the fact that RRA is directly related to the ratio of the
income and compensated wage elasticities of labor supply and presents a formula
that allows one to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion using labor supply
data. His risk aversion measure, γ, is the curvature of utility over wealth. The
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estimates of γ in his paper are constructed from previous empirical estimates of labor
supply elasticities and describe the risk aversion of a representative agent. While the
primary purpose of his paper is placing an upper bound on risk aversion, his measure
has the potential to be very useful in explaining individual risk preferences since
most microeconomic datasets contain the necessary information to estimate his RRA
coefficient. In this paper, I estimate Chetty’s coefficient of relative risk aversion,γ, at
the micro level using the 1996 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
Chetty’s paper provides new evidence that values of RRA greater than 2 are
not consistent with the empirical estimates of the uncompensated wage elasticity of
labor supply. Many existing empirical estimates of RRA are greater than 2, however.
Chetty contends that this is evidence that the expected utility model does not do
a good job of explaining choices under uncertainty in different domains. The 1996
PSID contains a measure of RRA based on an individual’s responses to questions
on hypothetical gambles. Because of this, I can compare a measure of RRA derived
from an individual’s labor supply behavior to a measure based on his choices under
uncertainty to see if the measure of risk aversion is consistent across these domains.
I then use data on health insurance coverage to determine whether each measure
correctly identifies individuals with high levels of risk aversion since individuals who
insure should be more risk averse than those who do not.
B. Background
1. Measuring Risk Aversion
Chetty (2006) provides the intuition behind estimating γ with labor supply data.
Recall that RRA is proportional to ucc
uc
where uc is the first partial derivative of the
utility function with respect to consumption and ucc is the second derivative. An
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agent’s compensated wage elasticity of labor supply is directly related to uc; the
larger the marginal utility of consumption, the more benefit the agent gets from an
additional dollar of income, so the more willing he is to work when his wage increases.
Income elasticity of labor supply is directly related to ucc; as ucc increases, the agent’s
marginal utility of consumption decreases significantly as income rises, causing him to
work less. Chetty is not the only one to link labor supply choices to risk preferences.
Smith et al (2003) use a semi-log specification of the hours of work equation, job risk
data, and wage rates to estimate the value of a statistical life.
Using the links between labor supply and the utility function, Chetty gives the
following expression for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ :
γ = −(1 + wl
y
)
εl,y
εlc,w
(y, w) + (1 +
y
wl
)εuc,l, (4.1)
where γ is “the curvature of utility over wealth – the parameter that determines risk
preferences over immediately-resolved wealth gambles in an expected utility model –
when total labor supply l is fixed” (2006, p. 4), w is the wage rate, y is unearned
income, l is labor supply, εl,y denotes income elasticity of labor supply, εlc,w denotes
compensated wage elasticity of labor supply, and εuc,l is the elasticity of the marginal
utility of consumption with respect to labor.
Using equation 4.1, Chetty solves for γ in terms of magnitudes that can be
estimated empirically (2006, p. 9).
γ = (1 +
wl
y
)
−εl,y
εlc,w
/(1− (1 + y
wl
)[ lim
4l→0
4c
c
/
4l
l
]) (4.2)
The numerator of the equation can be easily estimated from a wide variety of
data sources. Estimation of lim4l→0
4c
c
/4l
l
, on the other hand, requires information
on the “consumption choices of agents who face small, permanent exogenous shocks
to labor supply” (Chetty 2006, p. 10). This requirement sharply narrows the data
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from which γ can be estimated. A natural way to estimate this parameter is to look
at the changes in an individual’s consumption due to job loss or disability. Even this
strategy has its problems; estimation of the complementarity parameter requires small
fluctuations in l as opposed to the large ones that would come with job loss. Also,
job loss is likely to be a temporary fluctuation, and the model requires information
about permanent changes. Chetty cites many studies that estimate this parameter in
a variety of ways using many different data sources and concludes that 4c
c
/4l
l
< 0.15
and is probably closer to 0.1.
Because it is difficult to find the data necessary to satisfactorily estimate the
complementarity parameter, and it has been found empirically to be small, I will
assume that ucl = 0 in order to estimate γ. There is a large body of research that
contradicts the assumption that ucl = 0, for example, Browning and Meghir (1991)
and Browning and Crossley (2001). Ziliak and Kniesner find that consumption and
leisure are substitutes and “omitting consumption imparts a downward bias on the
non-labor income elasticity of labor supply and an upward bias on the compensated
wage elasticity of labor supply” (2005, p. 25).
If ucl > 0, my estimates of γ will understate the true γ. To preview future results,
with the assumption of additive separability, the mean of γ in my sample is 0.73. If I
assume that lim4l→0
4c
c
/4l
l
= 0.1, γ for the mean individual increases to 0.82. Unless
ucl varies with γ systematically in the population, mis-specifying ucl will cause a mis-
measurement in the level of curvature of the utility function, but not the difference
in curvature across individuals, which is of primary interest. While not ideal, the
assumption of ucl = 0 is critical to easily obtaining estimates of γ from a wide variety
of data sources. I examine whether this measure captures risk preferences in spite of
the limitations imposed by the simplifying assumptions.
The primary focus of Chetty’s paper is bounding the coefficient of relative risk
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aversion. Using previous empirical estimates of labor supply elasticities, he finds γ
to have a mean of 1 and an upper bound of 2. Existing empirical estimates of RRA
often find much higher values of relative risk aversion. I calculate γ at the individual
level and find it to have a mean of 0.733 in the sample. I compare these estimates
to an alternative measure of RRA based on hypothetical gambles. This gives me the
unique opportunity to compare two different measures of relative risk aversion over
the same sample.
2. Labor Supply Estimation
In order to obtain estimates of relative risk aversion, it is necessary to address several
issues involved in estimating labor supply. I must decide how wages and non-labor
income should be measured, what functional form the labor supply equation will take,
and what variables to include as controls. I must also address the life-cycle aspect
of the labor supply decision as well as potential endogeneity of wages and non-labor
income.
Because different economists take different approaches to the above problems,
estimates of wage elasticities in the past 25 years have varied widely. Pencavel (2002)
observed that early studies generally estimated static labor supply models and found
uncompensated wage elasticities that were small or even negative. More recent studies
have largely moved away from static specifications and have found a positive rela-
tionship between wages and hours worked. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) show that
if labor supply decisions have life-cycle aspects which are ignored, estimates based
on a static model often confuse the effects of movements along the wage profile with
shifts in the profile. Individuals plan for retirement, invest in human capital, and en-
gage in other activities that can only be understood in the life-cycle setting. Ignoring
these aspects leads to estimated parameters without clear economic interpretation.
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Fortunately, there is a cross-section specification that is consistent with life-cycle con-
siderations. Blundell and MaCurdy show that regressing hours of work on non-labor
income, age, age-squared, and log-wage allows for calculation of an elasticity that can
be interpreted as the within-period effect of a change in wage on work hours under
certain assumptions1 (1999, p. 1603).
Acknowledging life-cycle effects allows for elasticity estimates with economic in-
terpretation, but the estimates must be consistent to be meaningful. There are likely
endogeneity problems in labor supply estimation, i.e., variables that affect both wages
and hours worked that are unobserved to the researcher. If tastes for work are cor-
related with wages for example, cross-sectional estimation will provide inconsistent
estimates of wage elasticity. Two stage least squares (2SLS) is most often used to
overcome the endogeneity problem, but identifying good instrumental variables is an
on-going problem in the labor supply literature. In general, age and education in
higher order polynomials are used. Most studies include a variety of other instru-
ments that could possibly be correlated with wages without affecting hours of work.
These “kitchen sink” instruments are potentially problematic. If correlation between
the instruments and the regressor is weak, the distribution of the 2SLS estimator is
biased in the same direction as the OLS estimator in finite samples and standard
confidence intervals are unreliable (Staiger & Stock 1997). Lee (2001) suggests that
in order to limit the bias of the 2SLS estimator, strong instruments must be used.
When instrumenting wages, he finds it beneficial to remove all instruments but those
that both theoretical and empirical literature have agreed on: years of education and
experience.
1It must be assumed that the consumer knows that he will work for T periods,
that the effects of interest rates or time preferences can be captured by the intercept
and other parameters, and that the coefficient on age and age-squared for the lifetime
wage and income paths are constant across consumers.
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Non-labor income also poses endogeneity problems. People who are less averse
to work can save more money early in life that can be turned into non-labor income
in the future (Pencavel 2002). Married people may have more incentive to save
than their single counterparts because of present and future familial responsibilities;
marital status will be used as an instrument for non-labor income. I will analyze the
sensitivity of estimates to the instruments chosen in a later section.
3. Previous Estimates of RRA
As noted earlier, empirical estimates of RRA generally require very specific data.
Friend and Blume (1975) present some of the earliest empirical estimates. They used
1962 and 1963 Federal Reserve Board data to study the demand for risky assets and
concluded that relative risk aversion generally exceeds one and is likely greater than
two. Weber (1975) used consumer expenditure data from 1930-1970 and estimated
that RRA was between 1.3 and 1.8. Hansen and Singleton (1982) use consumption and
stock return data and estimate RRA to lie between .35 and 1. Using the hypothetical
gambles questions in the Health and Retirement Study, Barsky et al. (1997) find mean
estimates of RRA to be between and 0.7 and 15.8. In their paper on a nonparametric
measure of value-at-risk, Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (2000), construct an estimator of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion in a representative agent equilibrium model. They
use the S&P 500 and find that constant relative risk aversion ranges between 1 and 60
with a weighted average of 12.7. Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) estimate a structural model of the life-cycle consumption spending
of households. They find the relative risk aversion of an average household to be
between 0.5 and 1.4. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) use life insurance data in the
Health and Retirement Study to obtain estimates of RRA that range from 0.029 to
680.83. As their estimates are highly skewed, it is instructive to note that the median
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value of their measure of RRA is 0.888, and the interquartile range runs from 0.54 to
1.83. Many interesting questions about risk preferences remain unanswered because
of the limitations of the above datasets.
C. Data
I use data from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the
year 1996. The PSID is a good data set for this analysis because it includes all of the
necessary variables on labor supply and has been used extensively in the labor supply
literature. The 1996 PSID also included the ‘Estimating Risk Tolerance’ supplement,
whereby respondents’ coefficients of relative risk aversion were calculated from their
answers to a series of questions like the following:
Suppose you had a job that guaranteed you income for life equal to your
current, total income. And that job was (your/your family’s) only source
of income. Then you are given the opportunity to take a new, and equally
good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double your income and spending
power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income and
spending power by a third. Would you take the new job?
If the respondent said yes, the cut in income was increased to half. If he would risk
half of his income, he is asked if he would accept a potential cut in spending power
of 75%. If he would not take the initial gamble, the cut in income is decreased to
20%. If he refuses the 20% income gamble, the proposed cut in income is reduced to
ten percent2. Based on the individual’s response, he is grouped into 1 of 6 categories
which can be ranked by risk aversion without any assumptions as to the functional
2For more information visit:
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/data/Documentation/Cbks/Supp/rt.html
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form of the utility function. Respondents who rejected all gambles are placed into the
most risk averse category, followed by those who rejected the initial gamble and the
20% income gamble but accepted the gamble of 10%, and so on. The PSID includes
the individual’s responses to each of the 5 proposed gambles as well as a measure of
relative risk tolerance based on these responses.
The PSID risk supplement is based on similar questions in the Health and Re-
tirement Study and the corresponding paper by Barsky et al. (1997). A measure of
relative risk tolerance is included in the 1996 data that is calculated following the
method described in Barsky et al. (1997). In particular, if one is willing to assume
that relative risk aversion is constant over the relevant region, a respondent’s answer
to the above question places numerical bounds on his coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion. An expected utility maximizer will weigh the expected utility of the gamble
against the utility he derives from his current lifetime income. More specifically, he
will take the 50-50 gamble of doubling lifetime income at the risk of having it fall by
the fraction 1− λ if
1
2
u(2c) +
1
2
u(λc) ≥ u(c),
where u is the utility function and c is permanent consumption (Barsky et al. 1997,
p. 540).
Since the survey response is likely a noisy measure of a respondent’s true risk
preference, Barsky et al. (1997) assume that true relative risk tolerance, x, is normally
distributed and x = ln(RRA−1). The observed relative risk tolerance x∗ is in a given
risk category if x ∈ Bi where Bi is the range of log risk tolerance for the categories
described above. The utility function is assumed to be u(c) = 1
1−RRAc
1−RRA. A
likelihood function is constructed and RRA−1 is recovered by computing the expected
ex conditional on being in a particular group (Barsky et al. 1997, p. 545-546, PSID
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documentation). The PSID data includes this measure of relative risk tolerance, and
RRA is the reciprocal of this measure. There are four values of relative risk aversion
in the PSID sample, 1.754, 2.857, 3.571, and 6.667. The mean in the sample is 4.584.
For analysis in this paper, the population is defined as male heads of household
who are between the ages of 25 and 61. The PSID is set up such that if an adult male
is present in the household, he is considered the head. Female heads of household are
not considered at this time because there is some concern that the factors governing
female labor supply are different from those governing male labor supply. The age
restriction is intended to exclude individuals who may be combining school with work
and individuals nearing retirement. Also dropped were respondents who reported
being retired (714 observations), fulltime students (47 obs), permanently disabled
(249 obs), full time housekeepers (14), and those in prison (49). Respondents were
dropped if they worked fewer than 100 hours in 1995 (81 observations) or if they
reported zero earnings (250 observations). Seventy-two observations with wages of
less than $2/hour were also dropped. This leaves a sample size of 3900 individuals.
One hundred and four individuals did not report their educational attainment, so they
are not included in the regressions. The sensitivity to the age and wage constraints
will be examined in the Results section.
Hours of work is defined as weeks worked on respondent’s main job times hours
of work per week. Annual overtime hours and hours of work on a second job were also
included. The wage variable is defined as the total labor earnings of the respondent
in 1995 divided by his hours of work. Summary statistics for variables used in the
regressions can be found in Table 26.
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Table 26. Summary Statistics for Variables Included in Regressions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hours worked 3796 2223.134 608.915 104 5000
Wage 3796 18.047 16.78 2 403.9
Non-labor Income 3796 3223.504 13095.09 0 390000
Years of Education 3796 13.23 2.33 0 17
Married 3796 0.768 0.422 - -
Nonwhite 3796 0.307 0.461 - -
Age 3796 39.76 8.45 25 61
Notes: (i) Data is from the 1996 PSID and includes male heads of household
between the ages of 25 and 61. Respondents who report being retired, fulltime stu-
dents, disabled, full time housekeepers, or in prison were dropped. Respondents were
also dropped if they worked fewer than 100 hours in 1996, reported no earnings, or
had wages of less than $2 per hour. (ii) Hours of work is defined as weeks worked
on respondent’s main job times hours of work per week. (iii) The wage variable
is total labor earnings of respondent in 1995 divided by his annual hours of work.
(iv) The non-labor income measure includes rent, interest, dividends, retirement pay-
ments, help from relatives, and lump sum payments of the head as well as wife’s
income from unemployment, dividends, trust funds, other assets, child support, and
miscellaneous non-labor income.
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D. Empirical Specification
The labor supply specification is a life-cycle consistent variation of the familiar semi-
log specification:
Hoursi = a1ln(Wagei) + a2(Nonlabor Incomei) + a3(agei) + a4(agei)
2 + εi. (4.3)
This specification has several advantages. It implies that wage and income elasticities
vary systematically in the sample with hours worked, wages, and non-labor income,
allowing for unique elasticities to be calculated for each individual. This specification
can be estimated from a single cross-section, and it can also be interpreted in light
of life-cycle considerations. Lastly, its familiar form allows comparisons with many
previous studies. I estimate equation 4.3 by 2SLS, instrumenting for the wage and
for non-labor income.
In order to calculate the income elasticity of labor supply, the income variable
needs to provide variation in income that is independent of changes in the wage rate.
Although transfer payments such as welfare and unemployment compensation are
non-wage income, they are directly contingent on the amount of market work per-
formed in the period of interest. My measure of non-labor income therefore includes
income of the head of household from rent, interests, dividends, retirement payments,
help from relatives or other sources, and other miscellaneous lump sum payments.
The measure will also include the wife’s income (where applicable) from unemploy-
ment, dividends, interest, trust funds, other assets, child support, and miscellaneous
non-labor income. The sensitivity of estimates with respect to other definitions of
non-labor income will be considered in the next section.
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The income elasticity is given by
a2 ∗ (Nonlabor Incomei)
Hoursi
. (4.4)
Using the Slutsky equation, the compensated wage elasticity is calculated
a1 − a2 ∗Wagei ∗ Hoursi
Hoursi
. (4.5)
Substituting the measure of non-labor income, wages, and these elasticities into equa-
tion 4.1 and assuming ucl = 0 gives the coefficient of relative risk aversion:
a2(Nonlabor Incomei + Labor Incomei)
a2 ∗ (Labor Incomei)− a1 . (4.6)
E. Results
The first stage regression results are found in Table 27. Table 28 presents the 2SLS
estimation of equation 4.3. Wages are instrumented with education, education2, and
age∗education and non-labor income is instrumented with a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the head is married. It is important that the instruments be strong; IV
estimators perform poorly in finite samples with weak instruments. One test of weak
identification is the Cragg-Donald (1993) F statistic. Using the critical values given
in Stock and Yogo (2005), the null hypothesis of bias of more than 20% is rejected at
the 5% level. In addition, the F-test of the excluded instruments in both first stage
regressions is passed easily.
For instrument validity, the model must also be identified. The Anderson (1984)
canonical correlations test is a test of whether the excluded instruments are correlated
with the endogenous regressors. The likelihood ratio statistic is 25.94 and the null
hypothesis of underidentification is rejected with a p-value of less than 0.0001. The
Anderson-Rubin (1949) test confirms that log wages and non-labor income are jointly
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Table 27. First Stage Regressions of a Life-Cycle Consistent Labor Supply Function:
Log Wage and Non-labor Income. (Standard Errors)
Log wage Non-labor Income
Variable Coefficient Coefficient
Head Age 0.032** -555.027*
(0.01) (252.11)
Years of Education -0.098** -3919.247***
(0.04) (874.15)
Age2 -0.000*** 1.240
(0.00) (2.54)
Education2 0.005*** 106.905***
(0.00) (27.07)
Education*Age 0.002*** 46.625***
(0.00) (9.98)
Married 0.208*** -24.826
(0.02) (500.52)
Constant 1.578*** 31259.561***
(0.37) (8716.01)
Observations 3796 3796
F-statistic 193.033 28.899
Partial R2 0.19 0.03
Notes: (i) * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, ** at
the 5%, *** at the 1% level. (ii)Data is from the 1996 PSID and
includes male heads of household between the ages of 25 and 61.
Respondents who report being retired, fulltime students, disabled,
full time housekeepers, or in prison were dropped. Respondents
were also dropped if they worked fewer than 100 hours in 1996,
reported no earnings, or had wages of less than $2 per hour. (iii)
Hours of work is defined as weeks worked on respondent’s main job
times hours of work per week. (iv) The wage variable is total labor
earnings of respondent in 1995 divided by his annual hours of work.
(v) The non-labor income measure includes rent, interest, dividends,
retirement payments, help from relatives, and lump sum payments
of the head as well as wife’s income from unemployment, dividends,
trust funds, other assets, child support, and miscellaneous non-labor
income.
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Table 28. Two Stage Least Squares Estimates of Life-Cycle Consistent Labor Supply
Function: Total Hours Worked in 1995. (Standard Errors)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Log Wage 764.949*** (129.422)
Non-labor income -0.055*** (0.015)
Age -32.711* (17.983)
Age2 0.347 (0.219)
Intercept 1079.62*** (374.133)
N 3796
F (4,3791) 11.742
Sargan statistic 4.243
Anderson canonical
correlations statistic 25.940
Notes: (i) * Indicates significance at the at the 10% level, ** at
the 5%, *** at the 1% level. (ii) Wage is instrumented with educa-
tion, education2, and age∗education, and non-labor income with a
dummy variable indicating whether the head is married. (iii) Hours
of work is defined as weeks worked on respondent’s main job times
hours of work per week. (iv) The wage variable is total labor earn-
ings of respondent in 1995 divided by his annual hours of work. (v)
The non-labor income measure includes rent, interest, dividends, re-
tirement payments, help from relatives, and lump sum payments of
the head as well as wife’s income from unemployment, dividends,
trust funds, other assets, child support, and miscellaneous non-labor
income.
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significant in equation 4.3 with a p-value of less than 0.0001. Valid instruments must
also be uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from equation 4.3;
the Sargan statistic tests for both as a joint null hypothesis. A rejection of the null is
cause for doubt as to instrument validity. Table 28 shows a Sargan statistic of 4.243.
I fail to reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity with a p-value of 0.12.
In the labor supply regression the coefficient on log wage is positive and significant
at the 1% level. The mean compensated wage elasticity is 1.38. The coefficient on
non-labor income is also significant at the 1% level, but its magnitude is small. For
every additional $1000 of non-labor income, 55 fewer hours per year are worked on
average. The mean income elasticity is -0.091.
Chetty uses average income elasticity, wage elasticity, labor income, and non-
labor income to compute γ. Based on a number of prominent labor supply studies,
Chetty finds γ to be within the range of [0.15, 2.3]. Applying the same methodology
by plugging the estimated values of a1, a2, and the means in my sample into equation
4.6, I find the coefficient of relative risk aversion for the representative agent to be
0.801.
Chetty provides estimates of γ for a representative agent. Since my estimation
is done at the micro level, there is a unique wage elasticity, income elasticity, and risk
aversion coefficient for each individual in the sample. I obtain risk aversion measures
for the 104 individuals who did not report their educational attainment by using the
income that they do report and the coefficient estimates given in Table 28. Summary
statistics for the risk aversion coefficients and elasticities are presented in Table 29.
The estimates of γ range from 0.048 to 5.992 with a mean value of 0.73.
The instruments and the definition of non-labor income in this study are open
to question. As such, it is important that the estimates be fairly robust to changes
in these two factors. When I perform a Hausman test by including the predicted
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Table 29. Summary Statistics for Labor Supply Elasticities and Chetty’s Measure of
Relative Risk Aversion
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Income Elasticity 3900 -0.091 0.376 -9.905 0
Compensated Wage Elasticity 3900 1.382 0.997 0.309 22.491
Relative Risk Aversion 3900 0.733 0.267 0.048 5.992
Notes: I obtain risk aversion measures for the 104 individuals who did not report
their educational attainment by using the income that they do report and the coef-
ficient estimates given in Table 28. This brings the total number of observations up
to 3900.
residuals from both first stage regressions in the labor supply equation, I am able to
reject the null hypothesis that ordinary least squares provides consistent estimates
with a p-value of less than 0.001. While the Hausman test indicates that instruments
are necessary, the estimates of γ do not change significantly even if I do not instrument
for wages and non-labor income.
To check the robustness of the estimates to the instruments used, I re-estimate
equation 4.3 using different instruments for non-labor income and the wage. Estimates
of elasticities and γ from these robustness checks can be found in Table 30. Different
ethnic groups may have different levels of knowledge about investment opportunities
which may lead to differences in non-labor income. In 1984, blacks held only .08
percent of bonds and money market funds and only .03 percent of stocks and mutual
fund shares (Brimmer 1988), so an indicator variable for whether the respondent is
non-white will be included in Columns 1,4, and 5. I include state unemployment rate
in Column 3 and 4 because higher rates of unemployment may drive down wages in a
particular state. In Column 5 I check whether including higher order polynomials in
age and education affect the estimates of γ. The elasticity and risk aversion measures
are quite robust to changes in the instruments used. The mean risk aversion estimates
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Table 30. Estimated Coefficients on Log Wage and Non-labor Income and Correspond-
ing Means of the Income Elasticity, Compensated Wage Elasticity, and Rel-
ative Risk Aversion Resulting from 5 Alternative Sets of Instruments for
Log Wage and Non-labor Income.
Estimate Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Married, Married State State Educ3,Age3,
Nonwhite Unemployment Unemployment, age2∗educ,
Rate, Married, educ2∗age,
Married Non-white Non-white
Wage Coef. 771.447 764.949 759.343 764.453 749.413
Income Coef. -0.054 -0.055 -0.057 -0.056 -0.052
Mean εl,y -0.089 -0.091 -0.094 -0.093 -0.085
Mean εlc,w 1.372 1.382 1.416 1.409 1.315
Mean RRA 0.728 0.733 0.742 0.739 0.724
Notes: Instruments shared by all 5 specifications are education, education2, and
education∗age. Column 2 is the specification underlying the estimates reported in
Table 28
stay within the range of 0.72 to 0.74 as I change the instruments. Including head’s
father and mother’s education and an indicator for whether the head grew up in
poverty also has little effect on the estimates of γ.
There is less consensus on the empirical definition of non-labor income than
on the choice of instruments. To test the sensitivity of estimates to changes in the
definition of non-labor income, in Table 31 I consider the measure used in Pencavel
(2002), namely rent, interest and dividend income of the head. I also use a modified
Pencavel measure including rent, interest, and dividend income of the head and wife
(where present). Using these measures gives a smaller income elasticity estimate
and a larger wage elasticity estimate, but the estimates of γ change little (the mean
increases from about .73 to .79). I also consider a measure of non-labor income that
follows the same definition underlying Table 27 but also includes the labor income of
the wife.
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Table 31. Estimated Coefficients on Log Wage and Non-labor Income and Correspond-
ing Means of the Income Elasticity, Compensated Wage Elasticity, and Rel-
ative Risk Aversion Resulting from 4 Alternative Definitions of Non-labor
Income.
Estimate Non-labor Income Measure
Definition Rent, Interest, Rent, Interest, Income Measure from
Underlying &Dividends of &Dividends of Table 2 plus
Table 2 Head Head & Wife Wife’s Labor Income
Wage Coef. 764.949 727.193 727.30 1156.189
Income Coef. -0.055 -0.090 -0.087 -0.038
εl,y Mean -0.091 -0.048 -0.049 -0.332
εlc,w Mean 1.382 2.005 1.933 1.251
RRA Mean 0.733 0.792 0.785 0.762
Notes: The non-labor income definition underlying Table 2 includes rent, interest,
dividends, retirement payments, help from relatives, and lump sum payments of the
head as well as wife’s income from unemployment, dividends, trust funds, other assets,
child support, and miscellaneous non-labor income.
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Table 32. Estimated Coefficients on Log Wage and Non-labor Income and Correspond-
ing Means of the Income Elasticity, Compensated Wage Elasticity, and Rel-
ative Risk Aversion Resulting from Changing the Restrictions Imposed on
the Age and Wage Variables.
Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Restriction None 25 ≤ Age ≤ 61 30 ≤ Age ≤ 61 20 ≤ Age ≤ 61 25 ≤ Age ≤ 61
Wage Restriction None Dropped Wage = 2 Wage = 2 Wage = 2
if wage < 2 if wage < 2 if wage < 2 if wage < 2
Wage coef. 705.55 764.949 691.682 804.93 776.931
Income coef. -0.038 -0.055 -0.047 -0.059 -0.057
εl,y mean -0.076 -0.091 -0.086 -0.095 -0.094
εlc,w mean 1.03 1.382 1.231 1.434 1.409
RRA mean 0.654 0.733 0.728 0.723 0.731
Observations 4416 3900 3445 4268 3965
Notes: (i) Column 2 is the specification underlying the estimates in Table 3. (ii) Unrestricted data is from the
1996 PSID and includes male heads of household. Respondents who report being retired, fulltime students, disabled,
full time housekeepers, or in prison were dropped in all specifications. Respondents were also dropped if they worked
fewer than 100 hours in 1996 or reported no earnings.
As discussed in the data section, the sample is limited to individuals who are
between the ages of 25 and 61. Respondents who reported having wages of less
than $2 per hour were also dropped. The coefficient estimates are not particularly
sensitive to the age constraints, as shown in Table 32. I also examine the sensitivity
of the estimates to the wage constraints, by eliminating them or replacing the wage
value with $2 if wages were less than $2. With neither an age constraint nor a wage
constraint, the mean estimate of γ is 0.654. As I change the value of the constraints,
γ ranges from 0.723 to 0.733.
F. Further Examination of the Risk Measure
1. Comparing the Chetty and PSID Measures of Risk
Chetty’s measure of the curvature of utility over wealth using the PSID data is ro-
bust to changes in instruments and alternative definitions of non-labor income. But
how does it match up with measures of risk constructed from other domains? The
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PSID’s risk supplement affords me the opportunity to compare γ with an alternative
formulation for 3900 individuals. Since the measure in the PSID asks respondents to
consider a job as their only source of income, implying that non-labor income would
be equal to zero, the analysis in this section will be done by setting non-labor income
equal to zero in the Chetty specification. None of the results change significantly if I
allow non-labor income to be positive.
The Barsky et al. (1997) experimental method yields a mean RRA coefficient
of 4.584, while the mean of Chetty’s measure, γ, with non-labor income equal to
zero is 0.673. If I assume that utility is additively separable in consumption and
leisure when in reality it is not, γ may be understated, which could explain some of
the difference in magnitude of the two estimates. But if the expected utility model
is correct and these two methods are measuring the same phenomenon, the rate at
which an individual’s marginal utility diminishes and his answers to the hypothetical
gambles questions should place him at roughly the same point in the distribution of
individuals by risk preferences.
To test this, I constructed a variable that was equal to one if the individual’s
estimated risk aversion was greater than the median according to Chetty’s measure,
and another if the individual was more risk averse than the median according to
the PSID measure which is based on the respondent’s answers to the hypothetical
gambling question. If these two methods of measuring risk aversion quantify the same
phenomenon, we would expect a large overlap between the people in the high category
for both measures. Table 33 shows that this is not the case. In fact, the correlation
between the two “more risk averse” groups is 0.0375. People that the PSID measure
labels “more risk averse” are spread equally between the more and less risk averse
categories according to the Chetty measure.
γ looks at how individuals’ hours of work respond to changes in their wage or
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Table 33. Chetty Measure versus PSID Numerical Measure
Chetty’s Measure
PSID Measure RRA < Median RRA > Median Total
RRA < Median 937 864 1801
RRA > Median 1013 1086 2099
Total 1950 1950 3900
Notes: The variable “RRA < Median” is equal to one if the individual’s
estimated risk aversion was greater than the median according to a given
measure. If the two methods of measuring RRA quantify the same phenom-
enon, we would expect a large overlap between the high categories for both
measures.
their non-labor income. This should tell us something about their preferences. To
allow individuals in different risk aversion groups as classified by the PSID measure
to respond differently to the same levels of wages and non-labor income, equation 4.3
was estimated separately for each of the 6 PSID risk categories and γ was calculated
for each individual using the coefficient estimates for their group. Non-labor income
was set to zero in calculating γ, but wages and annual hours worked were allowed
to vary by individual. If the PSID measure and γ capture the same aspects of risk
aversion, the most risk averse PSID category should have higher values of γ than any
other category. The group that accepted all income gambles should have the lowest
values of γ. Table 34 shows how estimates of γ vary by PSID risk category.
Individuals who rejected all income gambles and thus are in the most risk averse
category according to the PSID measure have an average γ of 0.23, significantly
smaller than that of any other group. If the PSID measure and γ captured the same
risk tolerance for each individual, γ should decrease monotonically as we move from
the most risk averse category to the least risk averse category. Instead, it increases
until the second least risk averse category. Allowing for different responses to wages
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Table 34. Estimates of γ by PSID Risk Category: Wages and Hours Worked Allowed
to Vary by Individual
γ for PSID group
Risk Category Obs. Mean. Std. Dev Std. Err Min Max
Most risk averse 924 0.232 0.111 0.004 0.009 0.877
2nd most risk averse 626 0.611 0.131 0.005 0.090 0.967
3rd most risk averse 544 0.704 0.227 0.010 0.188 3.418
3rd least risk averse 487 0.754 0.120 0.005 0.061 0.957
2nd least risk averse 441 0.750 0.132 0.006 0.031 0.983
Least risk averse 209 0.518 0.157 0.011 0.048 0.931
Notes: Equation 4.3 was estimated separately for each of the 6 PSID risk cat-
egories and γ was calculated for each individual using the coefficient estimates for
their group. Non-labor income was set equal to zero. If the two measures explain the
same phenomenon, the largest values of γ should be in the most risk averse category.
and non-labor income by PSID risk category does not change the fact that the two
measures give very different values of risk aversion.
Wages and non-labor income vary systematically with responses to the PSID
risk question; individuals who rejected all income gambles and are in the most risk
averse category have the lowest average wages and non-labor income. Individuals
who accepted all gambles and are in the least risk averse category have relatively low
wages, but the highest values of non-labor income on average. We would like for the
measure of risk aversion to be capturing differences in preferences and not simply
capturing the differences in income between the six groups.
Table 35 examines this issue by estimating equation 4.3 for each of the six risk
categories and obtaining the wage coefficient, non-labor income coefficient, compen-
sated wage elasticity, income elasticity, and risk aversion measure, γ, for each group.
90
Table 35. Estimates of γ by PSID Risk Category: Wages and Hours Worked Set Equal
to the Overall Mean
PSID Risk Category
Most 2nd most 3rd most 3rd least 2nd least Least
Estimate risk averse risk averse risk averse risk averse risk averse risk averse
Wage Coefficient 372.48 571.02 367.16 728.38 906.72 770.55
Non-labor income Coef. -0.003 -0.028 -0.016 -0.076 -0.094 -0.024
εlc,w 0.213 0.749 0.458 1.691 2.097 0.779
εl,y -0.004 -0.039 -0.023 -0.107 -0.133 -0.034
γ 0.220 0.660 0.642 0.808 0.807 0.558
Notes: Equation 4.3 was estimated separately for each of the 6 PSID risk categories and γ was calculated for
each group using the coefficient estimates for the group. Wage income and annual hours worked were set equal to the
overall mean in estimating the elasticities and γ. Non-labor income was set to the group mean for estimating Income
elasticity and set equal to zero in estimating γ. If the two measures explain the same phenomenon, the largest values
of γ should be in the most risk averse category.
Wage income and annual hours worked were set equal to the mean for the entire
sample in estimating the elasticities and γ. Non-labor income was set to the overall
mean for estimating income elasticity and set equal to zero in estimating γ. The
only differences in the measures of γ for the groups are driven by differences in the
group’s reaction to changes in wages and non-labor income, not differences in wage
and non-labor income levels. Even when the only difference between the estimates
of γ for the 6 groups are the wage and non-labor income coefficients, the most risk
averse PSID category still has the smallest γ. As seen in Table 34, γ is largest for the
second and third least risk averse categories.
Under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion, the categorical responses
to the PSID risk question place bounds on the measure of relative risk aversion. It
is then possible to see if the estimated value of γ for each individual falls within the
risk aversion bounds implied by his responses to the risk question. Only 11.2% of
the sample did so. Ninety-nine percent of the 11.2% agreement was attributable to
the second most risk loving group whose implied bounds were between 0.306 and 1,
the range in which 98% of the estimates of γ fall. It seems that the measure of the
curvature of utility over wealth implies very different values of RRA than does the
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PSID measure. These results bolster Chetty’s claim that his paper “provides new
evidence that the conventional expected utility model falls short of explaining choices
under uncertainty in many domains” (2006, p. 2).
2. Comparisons of RRA by Health Insurance Status
As discussed in the previous section, the PSID measure and the Chetty measure imply
very different coefficients of relative risk aversion for the same individual. In order to
shed some light on this issue, I examine an individual’s health insurance status. In
his seminal paper, Pratt (1964) states that an individual has a larger coefficient of
relative risk aversion if and only if “he would be willing to pay more for insurance in
any situation.” I will compare the estimates of RRA for those with health insurance
to those without under the two measures to see which of the methods finds higher
risk aversion in individuals who choose to insure.
Consumers can choose their level of health insurance coverage in a variety of ways.
They can choose jobs which offer health insurance or purchase coverage through a
private health insurance company. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 60.4% of
the population of the United States in 2003 had health insurance through employer
provided programs. People who are very risk averse likely take health insurance
coverage into account when choosing their career. They may be more likely to take
jobs with generous health insurance packages and less likely to go into careers where
coverage is not offered.
Of the population not covered by employer provided insurance, 15.6% were with-
out health insurance in 2003 and 8.2% chose to purchase health insurance on their
own. The remaining 15.8% of the population was covered by government health in-
surance programs. Basic theory suggests that individuals with health insurance will
be more risk averse than individuals who do not have coverage.
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Table 36. Comparisons of Means of 1996 Variables: Sub-sample for Which Health
Insurance Is Available versus Original Sample
Variable Original Sample Sub-sample for whom Sub-sample for whom
Insurance Information Insurance Information
is available is not available
Mean Mean Mean
Hours worked 2222.536 2251.240 2160.077
Wage 18.014 18.747 16.419
Non-Labor Income 3196.445 3601.073 2316.017
Years of Education 13.232 13.475 12.695
Married 0.765 0.798 0.693
Non-White 0.303 0.261 0.394
Age 39.684 39.821 39.388
Number of Observations 3900 2672 1228
Notes: (i) The original sample is from the 1996 PSID and includes male heads of household between the ages
of 25 and 61. Respondents who report being retired, fulltime students, disabled, full time housekeepers, or in prison
were dropped. Respondents were also dropped if they worked fewer than 100 hours in 1996, reported no earnings, or
had wages of less than $2 per hour. (ii) The sub-sample is made up of the individuals from the original sample who
reported their health insurance status in 2001. (iii) Hours of work is defined as weeks worked on respondent’s main
job times hours of work per week. (iv) The wage variable is total labor earnings of respondent in 1995 divided by his
annual hours of work.
Information on health insurance coverage is not provided in the 1996 PSID.
Respondents were, however, asked to provide this information in 2001. Because of
the panel nature of the data, I can link the respondents in 1996 to their health
insurance information in 20013. Unfortunately, in 1997 the PSID moved to biennial
data collection and the number of families in the core sample was reduced by a third.
Of my original 3900 observations, I was able to match 2672 individuals with their
2001 information. Table 36 compares the means of individuals from the 1996 total
sample to the sub-sample for which health insurance information was available. The
remaining sample looks similar to the original sample. The individuals for whom I
have health insurance information have slightly higher wages, more non-labor income,
and are more likely to be white.
I do not consider those with government provided health care as part of the
analysis (98 observations). This leaves me with a sample of 2574 individuals. Of
3Re-estimating RRA using 2001 data is not an option as the PSID risk measure
is only included in 1996.
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Table 37. Summary Statistics by Health Insurance Coverage Group
No health coverage Has health coverage
Variable Mean Mean
Hours worked 2051.238 2273.153
Wage 10.889 19.609
Non-Labor Income 1365.032 3820.666
Yrs Education 11.991 13.636
Married 0.573 0.82
Non-White 0.414 0.243
Age 38.345 39.836
Number of Observations 220 2354
Notes: (i) The sub-sample is made up of the individuals from the original sample
(as described in Table 1) who reported their health insurance status in 2001. (ii)
Ninety-eight individuals with government provided health insurance were dropped.
(iii) Hours of work is defined as weeks worked on respondent’s main job times hours
of work per week. (iv) The wage variable is total labor earnings of respondent in 1995
divided by his annual hours of work.
this group, 86.56% has employer provided health coverage, 4.90% has private health
insurance purchased directly, and 8.55% is not covered by a health care plan. Sample
statistics for the covered and uncovered group are presented in Table 37. Individuals
with health coverage work more, earn a higher wage, have more non-labor income,
and more education. They are a year and a half older on average, more likely to be
married, and more likely to be white.
Individuals with no health insurance have a mean value of γ of 0.584 as compared
to a mean of 0.761 for those with health coverage. The p-value of the test of equal
means is less than 0.0001. According to the PSID measure, the mean RRA for those
without health insurance is 4.066 and for those with insurance is 4.583. We can reject
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that these two groups have the same RRA; the p-value on the test for equal means
is 0.003. The results from both measures accord with our expectation that more risk
averse individuals are more likely to insure.
As discussed in the previous section, we do not want differences in γ to be simply
capturing the differences in income between the two groups. To shed some light on
this issue, I run separate regressions for individuals with health insurance and those
without. This allows the two groups to respond differently to the same levels of wages
and non-labor income, which should capture any differences in preferences between
the two groups. I then evaluate the coefficient of relative risk aversion at the mean
for the entire sample of individuals in 1996 so that the estimates will not be driven by
the fact that those with health insurance generally have higher wages and more non-
labor income. Evaluating γ at $42,054.40 of labor income and $3,610.78 of non-labor
income, I find γ for those with no health insurance to be 0.923 and 0.785 for those
with health insurance. Bootstrapping this estimate, I find a mean difference of -0.133
with a standard error of 3.05. When I employ this implementation of the Chetty
method, I find no significant difference in the relative risk aversion of individuals
with health insurance as compared to those without. Due to the small sample of
individuals without health insurance, the precision of the estimates was poor which
could explain the lack of difference of the two estimates.
G. Conclusion
The explanations for many interesting economic phenomena employ the concept of
risk aversion, with the Arrow-Pratt measure as the generally accepted standard. Raj
Chetty (2006) introduced a new formula for estimating RRA from labor supply in-
formation, which was applied to micro data in this paper. I compare this measure
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to the measure included in the 1996 PSID which is based on hypothetical gambles
over lifetime income. The two measures appear to be substantially different, which is
compatible with Chetty’s claim that the expected utility model cannot fully explain
choices under uncertainty. It seems that expected utility explains little, if any, vari-
ation in risk preferences. I further investigate the differences in these two measures
by utilizing the fact that individuals who choose to insure should be more risk averse
than those who do not. I compared estimates of RRA for those with health insurance
and those without, ceteris paribus. In the PSID sample, the hypothetical gambles
method supported this hypothesis, with higher levels of risk aversion in those with
health insurance coverage. The Chetty method also supported this hypothesis when
income was allowed to vary for each individual. When I allow individuals with dif-
ferent health insurance status to respond differently to wages and non-labor income
and set income levels at the sample mean, the Chetty method finds no significant
difference between the two groups.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Women are found in systematically different careers than are men. It is difficult
to determine whether this is because women have the primary responsibility for the
home and children and thus desire different career attributes than men do or because
women face discrimination in the labor market. The lack of widely available data on a
woman’s expectations about her future make investigating this problem particularly
challenging as expectations are vitally important to understanding this phenomenon.
If a woman expects to have a large family or many in-home responsibilities, she may
be more likely to choose a career that is compatible with this choice. Expectations
are difficult to measure and are not always fulfilled and ignoring their importance can
lead one to incorrect conclusions about the cause of a woman’s career path.
Different religious groups have different beliefs on the importance of child bearing
and the division of labor within the home. The Southern Baptist church, for example,
teaches that “a wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her
husband” and she “has the God-given responsibility to respect her husband and to
serve as his helper in managing the household and nurturing the next generation.”
Because of differences in religious ideology, fertility expectations should differ by
religious denomination. If this is the case, including a woman’s religion in regressions
on job attributes should control for fertility expectations and expected effort expended
in household chores. In general, it appears that Jehovah’s Witnesses are likely to
choose the most flexible careers followed by Pentecostal, Catholic, and Baptist women.
There is no significant difference in the flexibility of Protestant groups which are more
likely to stress gender equality and women with no religious preference. When Jewish
women differ from women with no religious preference, they tend to be in less flexible
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careers. These results are consistent with the human capital notion that women are
choosing different careers than men rather than being forced into different job paths.
Women appear to be choosing jobs that allow them to take responsibility for
home production and child rearing. These choices of wives are likely to have an
effect on their husbands as well. Male wage regressions that include marital status
dummy variables find marriage wage premiums of between 10 and 40%. This could be
precisely because wives are taking the primary responsibility for home production and
husbands are free to focus their attention on productivity at work. On the other hand,
perhaps factors unobserved to the researcher may both make a man more productive
and more likely to marry. It is also possible that employers discriminate against single
men. To investigate this issue, I again use religious denomination, this time as a proxy
for specialization within the home. Pentecostal men and women, for example, were
not as likely to agree that “when a husband and wife both work, housework should
be shared equally” as were Catholic husbands and wives (Brinkerhoff and MacKie
1984). When a Pentecostal man marries, his wages increase dramatically, even after
controlling for a number of observable characteristics. Catholic men, Protestant men,
and Baptist men also benefit from large wage increases after marriage. The wage
premium for Jewish men appears to be in the form of increased wage growth. There
is no reason to expect that employers would prefer married Pentecostal men to single
Pentecostal men more than they prefer married Catholic men to single Catholic men,
so discrimination cannot explain these findings. Fixed effects estimation removes
time-invariant individual characteristics, and it is difficult to imagine a scenario in
which selection into marriage differs across religious denomination by a characteristic
that varies over time. These significant differences in marriage premium by religious
denomination provide new support for the productivity hypothesis.
The choice of a career, a level of specialization within the home, whether to
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marry and when, and most other important life decisions are heavily dependent on
one’s tolerance for risk. The role of risk preferences in these life choices is not fully
understood, largely because risk aversion is very hard to empirically quantify. Raj
Chetty (2006) introduced a new formula for estimating RRA from labor supply infor-
mation, which I apply to micro data from the 1996 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics.
The 1996 PSID also contains a measure of risk aversion derived from individual’s re-
sponses to hypothetical gambles over lifetime income. I compare the two measures
and find them to be substantially different, which is compatible with Chetty’s claim
that the expected utility model cannot fully explain choices under uncertainty. I
further investigate the differences in these two measures by utilizing the fact that
individuals who choose to insure should be more risk averse than those who do not.
I compared estimates of RRA for those with health insurance and those without,
ceteris paribus. In the PSID sample, the hypothetical gambles method supported
this hypothesis with higher levels of risk aversion in those with health insurance cov-
erage. The Chetty method also supported this hypothesis when income was allowed
to vary for each individual. When I allow individuals with different health insurance
status to respond differently to wages and non-labor income and set income levels at
the sample mean, the Chetty method finds no significant difference between the two
groups.
99
REFERENCES
Aı¨t-Sahalia, Yacine and Lo, Andrew W. “Nonparametric Risk Management
and Implied Risk Aversion.” Journal of Econometrics, 2000, 94, pp. 9-51.
Anderson, T.W. Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1984.
Anderson, T. W. and Rubin, H. “Estimation of the Parameters of a Single
Equation in a Complete System of Stochastic Equations.” Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, 1949, 20, pp. 46-63.
Arrow, Kenneth J. Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing, Helsinki: Yrjo
Jahnssonin Saato, 1965.
Barsky, Robert B.; Juster, Thomas F., Kimball, Miles S. and Shapiro,
Matthew D. “Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experi-
mental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 1997 111 (2), pp. 537-579.
Becker, Gary S. “Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor.”
Journal of Labor Economics, 1985, 3 (1), pp. S33-S58.
Blakemore, Arthur E. and Low, Stuart A. “Sex Differences in Occupational
Selection: The Case of College Majors.” The Review of Economics and Statistics,
1984, 66 (1), pp. 157-163.
Blau, Francine D. and Ferber, Marianne A. “Career Plans and Expectations
of Young Women and Men: The Earnings Gap and Labor Force Participation.” The
Journal of Human Resources, 1991, 26 (4), pp. 581-607.
100
Blundell, Richard and MaCurdy, Thomas E. “Labor Supply: A Review of
Alternative Approaches,” in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., Handbook of Labor
Economics, volume 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1999, pp. 1559-
1695.
Brimmer, Andrew F. “Income, Wealth, and Investment Behavior in the Black
Community.” The American Economic Review, 1988 (Papers and Proceedings),
78 (2), pp. 151-155.
Brinkerhoff, Merlin B. and MacKie, Marlene M. “Religious Denominations’
Impact upon Gender Attitudes: Some Methodological Implications.” Review of Re-
ligious Research, 1984, 25 (4), pp. 365-378.
Browning, Martin and Meghir, Costas. “The Effects of Male and Female Labor
Supply on Commodity Demands,” Econometrica, 1991, 59, pp. 925-951.
Browning, Martin and Crossley, Thomas. “Unemployment Insurance Benefit
Levels and Consumption Changes,” Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 80, pp. 1-23.
Chetty, Raj. (2006) “A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion.” The American
Economic Review, 2006, 96 (5), pp. 1821-1834.
Chutubtim, Piyaluk. “Home-Based Work, Human Capital Accumulation and
Women’s Labor Force Participation.” PhD Dissertation, Texas A&M University,
College Station, 2005.
Cornwell, Christopher and Rupert, Peter. “Unobservable Individual Effects,
Marriage and the Earnings of Young Men.” Economic Inquiry, 1997, 35 (2), pp.
285-294.
101
Cragg, J.G. and Donald, S.G. “Testing Identfiability and Specification in In-
strumental Variables Models,” Econometric Theory, 1993, 9, pp. 222-240.
Filer, Randall K. “Male-Female Wage Differences: The Importance of Compensat-
ing Differentials.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1985, 38 (3), pp. 426-437.
Friend, Irwin and Blume, Marshall. “The Demand for Risky Assets,” The
American Economic Review, 1975, 65 (5), pp. 900-922.
Goldstein, Sidney. “Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National
Jewish Population Survey,” in D. Singer and R. Seldin, eds., American Jewish Year-
book 1992, New York and Philadelphia: The American Jewish Committee; The
Jewish Publication Society, 1992.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Parker, Jonathan A. “Consumption over the
Life Cycle.” Econometrica, 2002, 70 (1), pp. 47-89.
Gray, Jeffrey S. “The Fall in Men’s Return to Marriage: Declining Productivity
Effects or Changing Selection?” The Journal of Human Resources, 1997, 32 (3), pp.
481-504.
Gronau, Reuben. “Sex-related Wage Differentials and Women’s Interrupted Labor
Careers-the Chicken or the Egg.” Journal of Labor Economics, 1988, 6 (3), pp. 277-
301.
Halek, Martin and Eisenhauer, Joseph G. “Demography of Risk Aversion.”
The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2001, 68 (1), pp. 1-24.
Hansen, Lars Peter, and Singleton, Kenneth J. “Generalized Instrumental
Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models.” Econometrica,
1982, 50 (5), pp. 1269-1286.
102
Hersch, Joni and Stratton, Leslie S. “Household Specialization and the Male
Marriage Wage Premium.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2000, 54 (1), pp.
78-94.
Hill, Martha S. “The Wage Effects of Marital Status and Children.” The Journal
of Human Resources, 1979, 14 (4), pp. 579-594.
Korenman, Sanders and Neumark, David. “Does Marriage Really Make Men
More Productive?” The Journal of Human Resources, 1991, 26 (2), pp. 282-307.
Lee, C.I. “Finite Sample Bias in IV Estimation of Intertemporal Labor Supply
Models: Is the Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity Really Small?” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 2001, 83 (4), pp. 638-646.
Loh, Eng Seng. “Productivity Differences and the Marriage Wage Premium for
White Males.” The Journal of Human Resources, 1996, 31 (3), pp. 566-589.
McDowell, John M. “Obsolescence of Knowledge and Career Publication Pro-
files: Some Evidence of Differences among Fields in Costs of Interrupted Careers.”
American Economic Review, 1982, 72 (4), pp. 752-768.
Murphy, Kevin and Welch, Finis. “Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles.” Journal
of Labor Economics, 1990, 8 (2), pp. 202-229.
Nakosteen, Robert A. and Zimmer, Michael A. “Marital Status and Earnings
of Young Men: A Model with Endogenous Selection.” The Journal of Human
Resources, 1987, 22 (2), pp. 248-268.
Pencavel, John. “A Cohort Analysis of the Association between Work Hours and
Wages among Men.” Journal of Human Resources, 2002, 37 (2), pp. 251-274.
103
Polachek, SolomonW. “Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach
to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure.” The Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics, 1981, 63, pp. 60-69.
Pratt, John W. “Risk Aversion in the Small and the Large.” Econometrica, 1964,
32 (1-2), pp. 122-136.
Sandell, Steven H. and Shapiro, David. “Work Expectations, Human Capital
Accumulation, and Wages of Young Women.” Journal of Human Resources, 1980,
15 (3), pp. 335-353.
Smith, V. Kerry; Pattanayak, Subhrendu K. and Van Houtven, George
L. “VSL Reconsidered: What Do Labor Supply Estimates Reveal about Risk Pref-
erences?” Economics Letters, 2003, 80, pp. 147-153.
South, Scott J. and Spitze, Glenna. “Housework in Marital and Nonmarital
Households.” American Sociological Review, 1994, 59 (3), pp. 327-347.
Staiger, Douglass and Stock, James. “Instrumental Variables Regression with
Weak Instruments.” Econometrica, 1997, 65 (3), pp. 557-586.
Stock, J.H. and Yogo, M. “Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regres-
sion,” in D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock, eds., Identification and Inference for
Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. Cambridge, MA:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Ureta, Manuelita and Welch, Finis. Wages and Interrupted Careers. Working
paper, 2001.
Weber, Warren. “Interest Rates, Inflation, and Consumer Expenditures,” The
American Economic Review, 1975, 65 (5), pp. 843-858.
104
Ziliak, James P. and Kniesner, Thomas J. “The Effect of Income Taxation
on Consumption and Labor Supply.” Journal of Labor Economics, 2005, 23 (4), pp.
769-796.
105
VITA
Megan de Linde Leonard received her Bachelor of Arts degree in economics and
business from Hendrix College in June of 2002. She received her Ph.D. in Economics
from Texas A&M University in May of 2007. Her fields of specialization are Labor
Economics, Economic Theory, and Public Economics.
She can be reached care of Dr. Manuelita Ureta at the Department of Economics,
4228 TAMU, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228, or by email at
Megan.d.Leonard@gmail.com.
